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INTRODUCTION

Angie Peang and Michael Lee were happily joined in matrimony in
Colorado.1 But when they crossed the border into Utah, where they
resided,2 their union transformed into one that was “incestuous and
void”3—for the spouses were first cousins.4 While Colorado is one of
nineteen jurisdictions that place no bar on marriage between first cousins,
Utah is among the majority that prohibit or severely restrict such unions. 5
Utah not only strips the Peang-Lee marriage of legal recognition, but
should the couple engage in sexual intercourse in their home state, they
may be charged with a third-degree felony, punishable by up to five years

1 Caitlin O’Kane, First Cousins in Love with Each Other Petition to Get Legally Married in
Utah, CBS NEWS (Mar. 6, 2019, 11:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/first-cousins-inlove-with-each-other-petition-to-get-legally-married-in-utah [https://perma.cc/68P6-JMV5].
2 Id.
3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1(1)(e) (West 2021) (“The following marriages are incestuous and
void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate: . . . marriages
between first cousins . . . .”).
4 O’Kane, supra note 1.
5 See infra Section I.B.
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in prison and a $5,000 fine. 6 Utah does offer an exception to its bar on
marriage for first-cousin couples who reach a statutory age of sixty-five,
or who are at least fifty-five and can prove one partner’s infertility to a
district court’s satisfaction. 7 However, for Peang and Lee, married many
years before the age thresholds, these exceptions offered little comfort.8
Indeed, the couple launched a campaign petitioning the Utah legislature
to legalize their love. 9
The Peang-Lees are not alone in their effort. 10 Since 1970, the
unanimous recommendation of the National Conference of

6 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-1(1), 76-7-102 (West 2021) (making it a third-degree felony
under the state incest statute for first cousins to engage in sexual intercourse); Criminal Penalties,
UTAH CTS., https://www.utcourts.gov/howto/criminallaw/penalties.asp [https://perma.cc/VGF2VMA2]. As of January 2020, the Peang-Lees were expecting their first child, increasing their risk
of being charged under Utah’s incest statute. Jane Ridley, Meet the Kissing Cousins Who Could
Face Prison for Having a Baby, N.Y. POST (Jan. 8, 2020, 6:57 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/
08/meet-the-kissing-cousins-who-could-face-prison-for-having-a-baby/?utm_campaign=iosapp
[https://perma.cc/RU4A-GVJC].
7 The statute provides: “First cousins may marry under the following circumstances: (a) both
parties are 65 years of age or older; or (b) if both parties are 55 years of age or older, upon a finding
by the district court . . . that either party is unable to reproduce.” § 30-1-1(2)(a)–(b). See also § 767-102 (state incest statute that functions as a companion to the marriage ban by making it a thirddegree felony for first cousins to engage in sexual intercourse).
8 See generally Nate Carlisle, Two First Cousins Are Upset They Couldn’t Get Married in
Utah. Here’s What the Law Says, SALT LAKE TRIB. (last updated Mar. 7, 2019, 9:04 PM),
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/03/07/two-first-cousins-love [https://perma.cc/6HU4HJK6] (reporting that, at the time of marriage, Peang and Lee were thirty-eight and thirty-seven,
respectively).
9 Angie Peang, Allow First Cousins to Marry in Utah, CARE2 PETITIONS,
https://www.thepetitionsite.com/954/693/035/allow-first-cousins-to-marry-in-utah
[https://perma.cc/8PCF-RAJ3] (seeking 2,000 signatures to urge the Utah legislature to overhaul
its “outdated” laws).
10 See, e.g., Morgon Mae Schultz, Lawmaking Is a Little Like Test-Taking: A Day with
Representative Phyllis Kahn, WAKE, Jan. 26, 2005, at 4, 7, https://web.archive.org/web/
20110717015436/http://www.wakemag.org/archive/20050125.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QZF29WQZ] (reporting that a Minnesota state legislator was inspired to introduce a bill to repeal the
state’s cousin ban after learning of the popularity of the practice among minorities, including the
Hmong and Somali populations). Meanwhile, Maryland legislators launched a failed attempt in
2000 to pass a law making it a misdemeanor for first cousins to marry in the state. While the law
passed in the House with a vote of 82-46, H.D. 459, 2000 Leg., 414th Sess. (Md. 2000), some
House members expressed concerns over the discriminatory tenor of the law and the mocking
discussion of such relationships on the floor. Matthew Mosk, Md. House Votes to Ban First-Cousin
Marriages, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2000), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/2000/03/
04/md-house-votes-to-ban-first-cousin-marriages/2d37c4b4-ac23-4505-8151-5aa60eaeb0b3
[https://perma.cc/5YYF-L4UN]. The law ultimately died in the Senate. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 2-202 (West 2021) (showing first-cousin marriage remains excluded from the list of
prohibited partners). See generally A.H. Bittles, The Bases of Western Attitudes to Consanguineous
Marriage, 45 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 135, 137 (2003). Professor Bittles of
the Murdoch University Centre for Comparative Genomics is the leading expert in the study of
consanguineous marriage. See, e.g., Camilla Stoltenberg, Commentary: Of the Same Blood, 38
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been for states to strike
restrictions on first-cousin marriage.11 The Model Penal Code incest
statute excludes first cousins from the class of blood relatives between
whom marriage, cohabitation, or sex ought to be criminalized. 12 The
National Society of Genetic Counselors advised in 2002 that first-cousin
couples be treated no differently than other partners for purposes of
reproductive genetic testing and counseling. 13 Yet, none of this has
sparked national change; instead, one state—Texas—codified a ban on
first-cousin intercourse after these recommendations were made. 14
Meanwhile, a national activist organization has emerged to destigmatize
first-cousin marriage, provide couples with community, and lobby for
statutory change.15
This Article will examine the constitutionality of these stubborn
prohibitions on first-cousin marriage in light of the fundamental right to
marry as articulated by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions over
the last century.16 This Article will not rehash the discussion over the
constitutionality of statutes governing intimacy between relatives writ
large.17 Rather, it will focus on first cousins as a discrete subcategory in
the regulation of marriage and sex between blood relatives that has until

INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1442, 1443 (2009) (stating that in study of “the prevalence and medical
consequences of consanguineous marriage . . . [Bittles] is the leading international authority within
the field”). My analysis of the biogenetic justification for cousin bans relies heavily upon his
research. See infra Section II.B.1.
11 79 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING 1, 186–87 (1970) (striking first
cousins from the model Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act to align with “the recent legislative
trend toward permitting first cousin marriages”).
12 M ODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (AM. L. INST. 2019).
13 See Robin L. Bennett et al., Genetic Counseling and Screening of Consanguineous Couples
and Their Offspring: Recommendations of the National Society of Genetic Counselors, 11 J.
GENETIC COUNSELING 97 (2002).
14 Jacob Sullum, Not Tonight, Honey. It’s a Felony, REASON (Aug. 20, 2010, 1:35 PM),
https://reason.com/2010/08/20/not-tonight-honey-its-a-felony [https://perma.cc/5BH6-DJ8G].
15 In
the Beginning, COUSIN COUPLES, https://cousincouples.org/in-the-beginning
[https://perma.cc/8X7J-5EYB]. The website was launched in 1998 by one half of a first-cousin
couple in search for community. Id. The site has grown to include hundreds of cousin-couple
members who exchange advice and discuss their relationships in the safety of the message board.
Id.
16 For a detailed discussion of the fundamental right to marry, see infra Section I.C.
17 That question has already been taken up by a host of law review articles and student notes.
See, e.g., Andrew J. Pecoraro, Note, Exploring the Boundaries of Obergefell, 58 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2063 (2017); Y. Carson Zhou, The Incest Horrible: Delimiting the Lawrence v. Texas Right
to Sexual Autonomy, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 187 (2016); Brett H. McDonnell, Responses to
Lawrence v. Texas: Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337 (2004); Carolyn S. Bratt,
Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q.
257 (1984).
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now been overlooked for independent analysis in legal scholarship, to the
detriment of the equality and constitutional rights of cousin partners.18
Part I will introduce the history of first-cousin relationships and the
national statutory landscape regarding first-cousin relations, to be
referred to throughout as the “cousin bans.” Part II will outline the
constitutional right to marry, how this right works in conjunction with the
states’ significant role in regulating marriage, and the appropriate
standard of judicial review applied to a right to marry challenge. Part III
will analyze whether the leading policy justifications for the bans, namely
the birth of biogenetically healthy children, protection of family
harmony, and maintenance of social progress, overcome the
constitutional test. Part IV will address two counterarguments: the first
based on principles of federalism, the second rooted in the fear of the
slippery slope. Finally, the Article will conclude the cousin bans are
unconstitutional, discriminatory holdovers from a dark period in
American history, and suggest first cousins’ right to marry be taken up as
the next battle in the fight for family law equality.

18 Analogously, prohibitions on marriage between step-relatives and affinal relatives have
received constitutional analysis separate from incest generally, given the unique character of those
relationships. Christine McNiece Metteer, Some “Incest” Is Harmless Incest: Determining the
Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest
Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. P OL’Y 262 (2000) (discussing relatives by affinity); Margaret M.
Mahoney, A Legal Definition of the Stepfamily: The Example of Incest Regulation, 8 BYU J. PUB.
L. 21 (1993) (analyzing relationships between step-relatives). One article explores the pitfalls of
classifying first-cousin marriage as “incest,” but does not broach the question of the cousin bans as
infringing on the constitutional right to marry. See generally Marvin M. Moore, A Defense of FirstCousin Marriage, 10 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 136 (1961). A 2002 legal analysis from CNN
discusses some of the issues analyzed in this Article, but that report predates crucial developments
in constitutional law, as well as expansions to the cousin bans themselves. See Joanna L. Grossman,
FindLaw Forum: A Genetic Report Should Cause a Rethinking of Incest Laws, CNN (Apr. 10,
2002,
2:51
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/04/columns/fl.grossman.incest.04.09
[https://perma.cc/U7EM-DFD4]. The need for a discrete treatment of the cousin bans can perhaps
be best articulated by the lazy inaccuracy of the following throwaway remark by the Supreme Court
in the majority opinion of United States v. Windsor: “[M]ost States permit first cousins to marry,
but a handful . . . prohibit the practice.” 570 U.S. 744, 767–68 (2013). As will be explained, infra
Section I.B, a great deal more than “a handful” of states prohibit first-cousin marriage.
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BACKGROUND
Historical Overview

Practice of First-Cousin Marriage

Though prohibitions against sexual relations and marriage between
partners within some degree of consanguinity have always been part of
developed societies,19 with a panoply of religious and legal traditions
drawing differing boundary lines, 20 first cousins are a unique class.21
Prohibitions on relations between those in the ascendant and descendant
line—for instance, parents and children—have remained relatively stable
since antiquity,22 yet first cousins have moved dynamically in and mostly
out of the banned class of marriageable kin over the centuries. 23 Firstcousin marriage has been the most widely sanctioned and consistently
practiced form of consanguineous marriage throughout history and into
modernity, emphatically embraced across cultures, religions, and social
strata.24
19 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 80–
83 (1988); see also MARTIN OTTENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES : THE AMERICAN MYTH OF
COUSIN MARRIAGE 1–22, 61–78 (1996). It is important to mention here that modern scholars treat
the incest taboo as neither ingrained nor biological, but as a changeable man-made construct with
arguable social benefits. See generally Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1501
(1998). Even so, first-cousin relationships remain an exceptional case, as any social interest
underpinning the incest construct is moot as applied to first cousins. See infra Section II.B.3.
20 See e.g., OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 10–15, 63–69. The medieval Catholic church went
so far as to prohibit marriage up to the seventh degree of consanguinity, meaning fifth cousins could
not marry. King Henry VIII, great slayer of marriage regulation, removed that bar for the United
Kingdom, and England has never questioned the validity of cousin marriage since. Id. at 70–72,
86–88; see George H. Darwin, Marriages Between First Cousins in England and Their Effects, 38
J. STAT. SOC’Y LONDON 153, 153 (1875) (reporting the Victorian-era Commons met a push to
research cousin marriage with “scornful laughter”); ALFRED HENRY HUTH, THE MARRIAGE OF
NEAR KIN 355 (1875) (scientists seeking information on cousin marriage were rejected as
“meddling animals”). The United Kingdom has been no stranger to restrictive marriage laws. See
Deceased Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7 c. 47 (lifting longstanding prohibition on
marriage between a man and his sister-in-law); see also infra note 27 and accompanying text. Yet,
even there, restricting or prohibiting cousin marriage was considered too absurd even to consider.
21 See infra Section I.B.
22 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 61–78.
23 See id. at 61–66, 89–91.
24 Id. at 1–20. Medical genetics studies frequently collapse first and second cousins, as well as
avuncular relationships, in their definition of consanguineous marriage, but the preeminent scholar
on the subject, Alan Bittles, has identified first cousins specifically as the leading form of inmarriage. See A.H. Bittles, Consanguinity and Its Relevance to Clinical Genetics, 60 CLINICAL
GENETICS 89, 89 (2001) [hereinafter Bittles, Consanguinity] (“[I]n many . . . populations there is a
strong preference for consanguineous unions, most frequently contracted between first
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Global Consensus on First-Cousin Marriage

Across large swaths of the globe, first-cousin marriages remain
permitted, prevalent, and preferential. 25 These unions are legal without
limitation in nearly every jurisdiction in the world. 26 Western legislation
of consanguineous intimacy relies heavily on the Old Testament’s
Levitical decrees and tabulations by the Anglican Church, both of which
sanction first-cousin marriage.27 In an illustration of the ancient sanction
of first-cousin marriage, the Bible includes multiple divinely licensed
examples of such relationships.28 First-cousin unions are favored by other
traditions as well, and no major religion prohibits it absolutely. 29

cousins . . . .”); Alan H. Bittles, The Role and Significance of Consanguinity as a Demographic
Variable, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 561, 561–65 (1994) [hereinafter Bittles, Role and
Significance]; accord Adam Kuper, Changing the Subject: About Cousin Marriage, Among Other
Things, 14 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 717, 724–28 (2008).
25 ALAN H. BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT 29–40 (2012). According to one study
published in 2014, 20–50 percent of marriages or more are consanguineous in North and SubSaharan Africa, the Middle East, and West, Central, and South Asia, regions with a collective
population of over a billion persons. Giovanni Romeo & Alan H. Bittles, Consanguinity in the
Contemporary World, 77 HUM. HEREDITY 6, 7 (2014); see also Diane B. Paul & Hamish G.
Spencer, “It’s Ok, We’re Not Cousins by Blood”: The Cousin Marriage Controversy in Historical
Perspective, 6 PLOS BIOLOGY 2627, 2629 (2008). The United States emerges as a standout
example of a country where cousin marriage was once popular, before taking a sharp turn to
prohibition. See infra notes 36–38. Contrast this with other Western countries, like the United
Kingdom, where first-cousin marriage may have decreased in popularity but remains legal. See
Romeo & Bittles, supra note 25, at 6; supra note 20.
26 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 61–66, 89–91; Sullum, supra note 14 (“The United States
is the only Western country in which marriage between first cousins is widely prohibited.”);
BITTLES, supra note 25, at 31 (noting only “[t]hree major sets of countries” have laws specifically
prohibiting consanguineous marriage—the United States, China and Taiwan, and North and South
Korea).
27 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 20–22, 72–74. The Old Testament’s list of prohibited
marriages includes parent-child, grandparent-grandchild, aunt-nephew, and sibling-sibling,
whether of the full or half-blood. Leviticus 18:6–20. The Anglican list is even more robust,
prohibiting affinal kin from marrying as well, yet still it excludes first cousins. Table of Kindred
and Affinity, BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER.
28 Instances of such unions in the Bible are Jacob, Rachel, and Leah in Genesis 29:18–28, and
the daughters of Zelophehad. Numbers 36:10–11 (“As the Lord had commanded Moses, so did
Zelophehad’s daughters do/Mahlah, Tirzah, Hoglah, Milcah, and Noah married their cousins.”).
29 In addition to Jewish law and the Protestant tradition, supra note 27 and accompanying text,
first-cousin marriage is permitted by Islam, Buddhism, the Parsee, and the Druze. OTTENHEIMER,
supra note 19, at 72–74; Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24, at 90–91; SURAH AN -NISA 4:22–
24; Jona Schellekens, Guy Kenan & Ahmad Hleihel, The Decline in Consanguineous Marriage
Among Muslims in Israel, 37 DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 1933, 1934 (2017); Bittles, Role and
Significance, supra note 24, at 565. Hinduism is split on the practice, with one stream finding it
preferable. Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24, at 91. The Roman Catholic Church permits firstcousin marriage by special dispensation. 1983 CODE c.1091, § 2; OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at
90; see also Cathy Caridi, Can Cousins Marry in the Church?, CANON L. MADE EASY (Sept. 9,
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First-cousin marriage has been popularly practiced throughout eras
and regions.30 Ancient Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome permitted first
cousins to marry.31 In Victorian England, approximately one out of every
fifty marriages was between first cousins, with the proportion growing as
one climbed the socioeconomic ladder. 32 Albert Einstein and Charles
Darwin both married their first cousins.33 The Rothschild banking family
was so keen on the practice that a whopping seventy-eight percent of its
Victorian-era marriages were between first or second cousins. 34 In areas
of Asia and Africa, first-cousin marriage currently accounts for twenty to
over fifty percent of all marriages. 35
The American consensus was once in favor of the practice as well.
First-cousin marriage in the United States was commonplace, legal, and
socially acceptable from the colonial period through the nineteenth
century.36 The Southern legal tradition explicitly ratified first-cousin
marriage.37 Any state that today prohibits first-cousin relations wholly
permitted them within the last century and a half. 38
3.

Empirical Evidence Regarding First-Cousin Marriage

Absent precise data indicating what percentage of all marriages in
the United States today occur between first cousins,39 the lowest estimate
puts them at less than one percent. 40 Others posit the unions are more
frequent but underreported.41 Researchers have certainly ascertained
2010),
http://canonlawmadeeasy.com/2010/09/09/can-cousins-marry-in-the-church
[https://perma.cc/8GV4-37WK].
30 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 61–63.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 81. Approximately one in twenty aristocratic marriages was between first cousins. See
generally Kuper, supra note 24, at 722.
33 Nikki Racklin,
We Are Family, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2002, 5:08 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/theobserver/2002/dec/08/magazine.features7
[https://perma.cc/
2QFJ-AMPP].
34 Kuper, supra note 24, at 728.
35 Bittles, Role and Significance, supra note 24, at 563–65.
36 Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at 2627–29; see also OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 58.
37 Bienen, supra note 19, at 1529 n.90 (noting the South utilized Archbishop Parker’s Table of
Degrees, which excludes first cousins, to define “incest” and prohibited marriage relations).
38 See infra Section I.B.
39 Mona Chalabi, How Many Americans Are Married To Their Cousins?, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT
(May 15, 2015, 11:22 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-many-americans-are-marriedto-their-cousins [https://perma.cc/282J-Z86L].
40 Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24, at 89–90.
41 The stigma attached to the practice may be responsible for such underreporting. Bennett et
al., supra note 13, at 99, 112; accord Denise Grady, No Genetic Reason to Discourage Cousin
Marriage, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/03/health/
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these relationships continue to occur,42 and the national decline correlates
only with the sudden emergence of the cousin bans in the decades
immediately after the Civil War.43
B.

Regulatory Landscape
1.

The Cousin Bans

First cousins are currently limited or barred outright from either
marrying, cohabitating, or having intercourse in thirty states. 44 Six states
provide exceptions to blanket prohibitions. 45 In five of these jurisdictions,
no-genetic-reason-to-discourage-cousin-marriage-study-finds.html
[https://perma.cc/GRX2WHG4].
42 See OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 58–59; see also Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at
2627–29.
43 Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at 2627–29. In 1858, Kansas became the first state to prohibit
cousin marriage. Before 1930, twenty-eight states passed a cousin ban. Only three states have taken
prohibitory action in the last century: Kentucky (1946), Maine (1985), and Texas (2005). Id. at
2627; OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 58–59.
44 See OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 11. The states imposing some form of a cousin ban are:
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3608, 25-101 (2021);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-106 (West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2021); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 2021); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-3 (West 2021); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 595.19(1)(c) (West 2021); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2503 (West 2021); KY. REV. STAT. ANN .
§ 402.010(1) (West 2021); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 90 (2021); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§ 701(2)(B) (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.3(3)–(4) (West 2021); MINN. STAT. ANN .
§§ 517.03-3, 518.01 (West 2021); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 93-1-1, 93-7-1, 97-29-27 (West 2021);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 451.020, 451.115 (West 2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(1)(b) (West
2021); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.020(1) (West 2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:2 (2021);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-3 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03-03 (West 2021); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (West 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 2 (West 2021); OR. REV .
STAT. ANN. § 106.020 (West 2021); 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1304, 1703 (West
2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-6 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-1(2), 76-7-102 (West
2021); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.004, 6.201 (West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02 (West
2021); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020(1)(b) (West 2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2302(a)–(b) (West 2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03 (West 2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-101
(West 2021).
45 They are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, Wisconsin, and Maine. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-101(b) (first cousins may not marry unless both partners are over sixty-five, or they present
proof to a judge of one partner’s infertility); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(4) (first cousins
may not marry unless both partners are over fifty, or they produce a doctor-certified attestation of
their permanent and irreversible sterility); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-3 (first cousins may not
marry unless both partners are over sixty-five); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1(2) (first cousins may
not marry unless both partners are over sixty-five, or fifty-five and the court finds either party
unable to reproduce); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(1) (first cousins may not marry unless the female
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first cousins are permitted to marry if the partners meet a statutory age
threshold, ranging from fifty to sixty-five years old, or present affirmation
to the court of their infertility or sterility. 46 The age restriction has been
paired with a proof of sterility requirement in most instances. 47 Maine
allows first cousins to marry, provided the couple first presents
certification of having received special genetic counseling. 48
2.

Regulation of Other Consanguineous Relationships

While marriage law and incest criminalization are distinct
regulatory schemes—the former governing who may marry, the latter
establishing who may legally engage in sexual intercourse—legislation
of consanguineous relationships often operates cohesively across both
systems.49 States will frequently use the language of “incest” in their
marriage regulations, defining who may marry by reference to who may
have sex.50 Consequently, all fifty states prohibit marriage between
members of the nuclear family, 51 and all states with incest statutes
criminalize intercourse between parents and children. 52 All but one do the
same for siblings, with Ohio the sole outlier. 53
The cousin bans depart from the general pattern that if a category of
prohibited partners appears in one type of statutory scheme, it appears in

is over fifty-five or an affidavit signed by a medical professional is produced indicating either
partner is permanently sterile); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)(B) (first cousins may not
marry unless they present a certificate that they have received genetic counseling).
46 They are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Utah, and Wisconsin. ARIZ. REV . STAT. ANN. § 25101(b); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212(4); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8-3; UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-1(2); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(1).
47 Bratt, supra note 17, at 267. Incidentally, age and fertility restrictions reveal state
legislatures’ ongoing preference for hetero-normative marital structures; age and fertility would
appear to be entirely irrelevant bases upon which to restrict a same-sex first-cousin couple from
marrying. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2014).
48 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)(B).
49 CHARLES E. TORCIA, 2 W HARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 241 (15th ed. 2020).
50 Id.; see, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-29-27 (West 2021) (“If any person shall marry within
the degrees prohibited by law, he shall be guilty of incest . . . .”). To be very clear, a prohibition on
marriage does not de facto make such a relationship incestuous. WILLIAM MACK, WILLIAM
BENJAMIN HALE & DONALD J. KISER, 31 CORPUS JURIS: BEING A COMPLETE AND SYSTEMATIC
STATEMENT OF THE WHOLE BODY OF THE LAW AS EMBODIED IN AND DEVELOPED BY ALL
REPORTED DECISIONS 376 (1923). These are separate, distinct areas of legislation. Id.
51 JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 45 (2011).
52 McDonnell, supra note 17, at 349. In general, statutory variation increases as one moves
further away from the biological nuclear family. Id. at 348–50.
53 Id. at 349; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03 (West 2021).
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the other.54 Consequently, the vast majority of states banning or limiting
marriage or cohabitation between first cousins exclude them from their
incest prohibitions.55 Only nine states currently prohibit sex between first
cousins.56
These incongruities lead to striking results. Arizona prohibits and
voids marriage between first cousins and considers sex between them
incestuous.57 Yet, the state will retract its prohibition on marriage
provided both partners are over the age of sixty-five, or are younger but
can prove infertility.58 Presumably, at that time, sex between first cousins
in Arizona ceases to be statutory incest. Meanwhile, Texas will not
conduct a marriage between first cousins but does not void those
conducted legally elsewhere; yet, the State does criminalize sexual
intercourse between first cousins. 59 As a result, legally married first
cousins who engage in sexual intercourse in Texas face a maximum of
ten years in prison, a $10,000 fine, and registration as sex offenders.60

54 TORCIA, supra note 49; GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 45–46; accord Joanna
L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84
OR. L. REV. 433, 437–38 (2005).
55 Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-101 (West 2021) (declaring first-cousin marriages
“void”) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-1(1)(e) (West 2021) (declaring first-cousin marriages
“incestuous and void” (emphasis added)). Whether a statute declares cousin marriage “void” or
“incestuous and void” has serious consequences because the specific language influences
jurisdictional approaches whether to recognize cousin marriages legally solemnized abroad. See
generally Frederic P. Storke, The Incestuous Marriage—Relic of the Past, 36 U. COLO. L. REV.
473 (1964). Courts have struggled to settle these contradictions. See, e.g., Ghassemi v. Ghassemi,
998 So. 2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Couvillion, 42 So. 431 (La. 1906). For a longer
discussion of the jurisdictional chaos, see infra Part II.
56 The nine states that currently prohibit sex between first cousins are Arizona, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-3608, 25-101 (2021); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-29-5, 93-1-1 (West 2021); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 122.020, 201.180 (West 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN . §§ 12.1-20-11, 14-03-03
(West 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 885, tit. 43, § 2 (West 2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 22-22A-2, 25-1-6 (2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.02(a)(6) (West 2021); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-7-102 (West 2021); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 944.06, 765.03 (West 2021). These are not
toothless laws that are on the books but never enforced. Compare that number to the thirteen states
that banned sodomy before Lawrence struck such statutes as unconstitutional. McDonnell, supra
note 17, at 350 n.93 (counting eight states with such prohibitions, as that article was published prior
to Texas’s enactment of its regulation in 2010).
57 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3608, 25-101.
58 Id.
59 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101, 2.004, 6.201 (West 2021); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 25.02.
60 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 (West 2021); see also Sullum, supra note 14. For the bizarre
results of criminalizing sex between consenting, adult first cousins, see State v. Nakashima, 114 P.
894 (Wash. 1911).
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Constitutional Implications

Two principles enjoy near-universal recognition. First, the state
plays a central role in regulating marriage. 61 Second, the Supreme Court
has recognized a constitutional right to marry embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment.62 This Section will articulate the contours of the right to
marry. It will then consider how this constitutional right exists beside the
state’s recognized role in regulating marriage. Finally, it will discuss what
level of scrutiny applies to state infringements upon the fundamental right
to marry.
1.

The Right to Marry

For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has articulated some
notion of the right to marry as basic and integral to individual liberty. 63
Since 1923, the Court has listed marriage as a fundamental,
unenumerated right protected by the Constitution’s “liberty” promise. 64
Marriage was understood as essential to personal freedom and, therefore,
resistant to unbridled state intrusion. 65
2.

Due Process or Equal Protection?

The Court has, however, been coy about where the constitutional
cover for the right to marry arises. 66 It has emphasized the fundamental
quality of the right, clearly grounding it in the Due Process Clause of the
61 Brian H. Bix, State Interests in Marriage, Interstate Recognition, and Choice of Law, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 337, 338–39 (2005) (“[T]he history of American family law (in particular,
American marriage law) has been one of state control . . . .”).
62 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721 (1997) (listing the right to marry among
a limited number of well-established unenumerated rights); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
224 (1990) (reaffirming without elaboration that the “right to marry . . . [is] a right protected by the
Due Process Clause”); see also Metteer, supra note 18, at 265.
63 For discussion at length of the Supreme Court’s right to marry jurisprudence, see Lynn D.
Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 1790-1990, 41 HOW. L.J. 289
(1998).
64 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and
bring up children . . . .”); see also Metteer, supra note 18, at 265.
65 See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (“[M]atters relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing . . . [are] areas it has been held
that there are limitations on the States’ power to substantively regulate conduct.”); see also supra
Section I.C.5.
66 See infra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment. 67 But it has also repeatedly infused its opinions
with explicit concern for the identities of the persons who have had their
exercise of the right infringed upon—an appeal to the Equal Protection
Clause.68 This Section will show that in relying on both doctrines, the
Court has indicated that the right to marry protects the right specifically
as it is vested in individuals, making the right all the more resistant to
state intrusion.
The fusion of due process and equal protection doctrines for
marriage purposes began in Loving v. Virginia, the first case in which the
Court struck down a state law as an infringement on a fundamental right
to marry.69 Calling marriage a “vital personal right[],” and among “the
‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and
survival,” the Court invalidated racial classification systems as an
unconstitutional means of prohibiting marriage. 70 Marriage was not
merely a permitted activity a state could encroach upon with little
justification, but a right expressly protected by the Constitution from a
measure of state intrusion.71
Loving explicitly established that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to marry and that, in the future,
states would stand in direct opposition to the Constitution by enacting
statutes that infringe upon marriage.72 In Boddie v. Connecticut, the Court
held a law barring indigents’ access to divorce courts based only on their
inability to pay to be a denial of due process.73 The fundamental nature
of the marriage relationship itself74 was key to the Court’s reasoning.75
The payment requirement was an impediment, impassable for some, to a
key right protected by due process and the state could not justify it. 76 Yet,
67

GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 38–39; see also Metteer, supra note 18, at 265–

68

GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 38–39; see also Metteer, supra note 18, at 265–

67.
69.
69

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
71 Id. (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”); see also GROSSMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 37–38.
72 See generally Wardle, supra note 63.
73 401 U.S. 371, 376–81 (1971).
74 Id. at 374 (noting that “given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society’s
hierarchy of values,” due process acts as a stay on the state’s ability to regulate it (emphasis added)).
75 Id. at 379 (“[T]hat a statute or a rule may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when it
operates to deprive an individual of a protected right although its general validity as a measure
enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is beyond question.” (emphasis added)).
76 Id. at 382–83 (“We do not decide that access for all individuals to the courts is a right that
is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by [due process] . . . [but] in the case before us this right is the
exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.”).
70
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due process does not serve as an absolute bar to government regulation. 77
In Califano v. Jobst,78 the Court held due process had not been violated
because the challenged regulation had only a tenuous tie to marriage, with
spousal choice implicated as a mere downstream effect of other
regulatory objectives. 79
Importantly, the classification scheme in Loving proscribing
marriage based on the partners’ race triggered the Equal Protection
Clause as well.80 While the racial discrimination itself would have
independently called for heightened scrutiny under equal protection
separate from the marriage issue, 81 Loving did not recognize a highly
specialized fundamental right to interracial marriage.82 Rather, it found
suspect a classification scheme in the context of the right to marry and
suggested that interracial marriage could not be constitutionally
constrained because of the right to freely choose whom to marry.83
The Court would continue over decades to turn a particularly sharp
eye to marriage regulations that isolated a particular group for uniquely
impaired exercise of the right. In Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court
invalidated a regulation forbidding marriage without prior court approval
to noncustodial parents who were delinquent in their child support
payments.84 State court approval would not be granted without showing
the support obligation had been met and that the children were not then
nor likely to become public charges. 85 The Court applied an equal
protection analysis even though “noncustodial parents” are not a
canonically protected identity because an identity-based classification
had been used to attack a fundamental right. 86 Like in Loving, the Court
77

See infra Section I.C.4.
434 U.S. 47 (1977).
79 The regulation under review specified that certain secondary benefits under the Social
Security Act received by a disabled dependent would terminate upon the dependent’s marriage to
an individual not entitled to those benefits. Id. The Court applied the general rule that entitlement
as a dependent to statutory benefits terminates upon the dependent’s marriage. Id. at 52–54. The
Court applied a mere reasonableness standard to hold that “favored treatment of marriages between
secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principle of equality embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 56–58.
80 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
81 Id. at 8–11.
82 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015) (stating that “Loving did not ask about a
‘right to interracial marriage’”); Metteer, supra note 18, at 266–69 (explaining that Loving began
“the development of the right to marry . . . as a protected activity whose ‘Constitutional shelter’ is
the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than simply a permitted activity”).
83 Hamby v. Parnell, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (D. Alaska 2014) (finding Loving “hinged on”
recognition of “the freedom to marry, without an additional descriptor”).
84 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
85 Id. at 375.
86 Id. at 383–84; GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 39.
78
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did not find a unique, constitutionally-protected right to marry that was
exclusive to this certain group, but insisted that the persecuted class, like
all individuals, enjoys a right to marry.87 Repeatedly, the Court would act
in defense of a class against state impairment of class members’ ability
to exercise their marriage right, independent of whether the
distinguishing personal characteristic used to define the class was itself
traditionally protected.88
Justice Potter Stewart’s Zablocki concurrence criticized the majority
exactly for this unusual approach to equal protection doctrine. 89 Justice
Stewart emphasized that the due process “liberty” promise normatively
and sufficiently accomplished protection of fundamental rights, including
the right to marry.90 Yet, by avoiding being wedded to a standard due
process fundamental rights analysis, the Zablocki majority indicated the
right to marry is ingrained in the individual and that personal identities
could not easily serve as the basis for losing that right.91
This elision of due process and equal protection doctrines for right
to marry purposes was taken to its furthest bounds in Obergefell v.
Hodges.92 There, the majority resisted stating altogether in what way
specifically it deployed either clause in finding same-sex couples had a
constitutional right to marry. 93 Instead, the Court wrote that the two
doctrines are “connected in a profound way,” working dynamically
together to identify and define fundamental rights as expressed by every

87

Compare Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383–85, with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015) (“Zablocki did not ask about a ‘right of
fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.’”); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 79 (1987)
(recognizing the right to marry for incarcerated persons); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971) (recognizing the right to marry for indigents).
89 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 391–96 (Stewart, J., concurring) (approving of the lower court’s
approach to the right to marry as a due process issue, and insisting, “[t]he problem in this case is
not one of discriminatory classifications, but of unwarranted encroachment upon a constitutionally
protected freedom,” as it conflicts with the “liberty” promise).
90 Id. Such an approach would have required expansion of substantive due process but, in
Justice Stewart’s view, broadening that murky doctrine would have been preferable and more
consistent with past principles of constitutional analysis. Id. at 395–96.
91 Id. at 386–88, 390–91 (majority opinion).
92 576 U.S. 644.
93 Id. at 663–72; see also Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129
HARV. L. REV. 147, 152–64 (2015). For criticism of Obergefell’s adoption of this approach, see
generally Charles Adside III, Constitutional Damage Control: Same-Sex Marriage, Smith’s Hybrid
Rights Doctrine, and Protecting the Preacher Man After Obergefell, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
145, 169–74 (2017). See also RODNEY M. PERRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44143, OBERGEFELL V .
HODGES: SAME -SEX MARRIAGE LEGALIZED 6–8 (2015) (illustrating the murkiness of Obergefell’s
reliance on due process and equal protection doctrines). Dissenting Justices in Obergefell criticized
the majority for abandoning careful substantive due process analysis. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 737
(Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 697–98 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
88
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individual’s unique character or identity. 94 The Court coined the term
“equal dignity” to describe this fusion of equal protection and due process
in the marriage context.95
Kenji Yoshino96 credits the Obergefell Court with introducing an
artistic approach to due process and equal protection, infusing the former
with a concern that liberties be granted to subordinated groups, a matter
historically relegated to the latter clause. 97 Laurence Tribe98 emphasizes
that, by intertwining the clauses, the Court expressly protected the
identity of the individual exercising the right to marry. 99 In this way,
Obergefell continued the Court’s long project of establishing that any
regulation utilizing an identity-based classification model in the marriage
context tangles with both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.100 Beginning in Loving, continuing in Zablocki, and pushing
forward in Obergefell, the Court expressed that the right to marry
inherently includes the freedom to follow one’s personal path in
exercising it.101
94 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 672 (majority opinion) (“In any particular case one Clause may be
thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the
two Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right.”).
95 Id. at 674 (“These classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women.”). Previously
in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy had repeatedly referenced “dignity” in striking sodomy
statutes as unconstitutional invasions of the due process right to privacy. Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 560, 567, 575 (2003). Yet, in Lawrence, Kennedy eschewed an equal protection
argument. Id. at 579–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Kennedy’s use in Obergefell of the term “equal
dignity” lends support to the proposition that the term may be referencing something more than
mere dignity alone and was intending to establish a fused equal protection -due process doctrine.
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16
(2015).
96 Kenji Yoshino is the Chief Justice Earl Warren Professor of Constitutional Law at New York
University School of Law. Kenji Yoshino, NYU L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/
index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=22547 [https://perma.cc/B38B-PY4K].
97 Yoshino, supra note 93, at 171–79 (describing Obergefell as introducing an
“antisubordination liberty” doctrine).
98 Laurence Tribe is the Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Emeritus, at Harvard Law School.
Laurence H. Tribe, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10899/Tribe
[https://perma.cc/4PTG-2XTT].
99 Tribe, supra note 95, at 17, 23–32.
100 See generally Laurence C. Nolan, The Meaning of Loving: Marriage, Due Process and
Equal Protection (1967–1990) as Equality and Marriage, from Loving to Zablocki, 41 HOW. L.J.
245, 246 (1998); see also Wardle, supra note 63, at 336–42; but see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty or
Equality? (Sept. 23, 2015), 2015 Anthony M. Kennedy Lecture, in 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 381
(2016) (arguing Justice Kennedy hinged Obergefell almost entirely on due process rather than equal
protection).
101 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”);
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (citing Loving for the
proposition that “the right to marry means little if it does not include the right to marry the person
of one’s choice”).
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Defining Marriage

The Supreme Court has never articulated the exact parameters of the
right to marry, but its marriage jurisprudence offers guideposts for what
the right includes. 102 For many decades, the Court understood the
importance of marriage as a functional vehicle for reproduction and the
propagation of the traditional nuclear family.103 Pragmatically, marriage
was the sole means for producing legitimate children and ensuring that
engaging in intimate relations would not bar one from entry into
heaven.104 Skinner v. Oklahoma directly linked the right to marry with a
fundamental right to reproduce. 105 In striking down mandated
sterilization of individuals with allegedly heritable criminal traits, the
Court described reproduction and marriage as co-dependent, both being
fundamental to one’s existence. 106
In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court expanded the activities
protected by their association with the right to marry to include marital
intimacy, holding a state could not ban or abet the use of contraceptives
by married couples. 107 While still facially limited to marriage’s
childbearing and child-rearing purposes,108 Griswold hinted at something
more.109 The Court described marriage as a near-sacrosanct union of
individuals.110 The value of marriage was expressly understood not in
light of its promotion of any political, commercial, or social cause,
102

Wardle, supra note 63, at 346–47.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 (1878) (“Upon [marriage] society may be
said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties . . . .”);
Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) (without marriage “there would be neither civilization
nor progress”); see Jill Lepore, To Have and To Hold, NEW YORKER (May 18, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/25/to-have-and-to-hold [https://perma.cc/98JWWJG4] (discussing the modern effort to disassociate marriage and sex from reproduction in
constitutional analysis).
104 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 49–53.
105 316 U.S. 535 (1942); see also Wardle, supra note 63, at 299–300.
106 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (“We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the
basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race.”). A lengthier discussion of Skinner’s implications for the cousin bans follows.
See infra Section II.B.1.
107 381 U.S. 479, 479–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”). A “liberty” right to privacy in intimate
association has since been protected outside of the context of marriage, which carries important
implications as society expands to include non-marital relationships. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 573–74 (2003); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
108 See Zhou, supra note 17, at 224.
109 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
110 Id. (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred.”).
103
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project, or system; rather, marriage itself was cherished and protected
because it carries a “noble . . . purpose” and offers those involved “a
harmony in living.”111
The Court eventually explicitly expanded the right to marry as
containing more than a concern for human perpetuation and the intimate
association reproduction requires.112 In Turner v. Safley, the Court
invalidated a state regulatory scheme prohibiting inmates from marrying
without express prior permission from the prison warden, expressly
extending constitutional protection to the non-reproductive
characteristics of marriage. 113 The Court found that the right to marry
includes within it an appreciation for marriage as a public manifestation
of support and commitment, as an expression of spiritual and personal
significance, and as a necessary precondition for many desirable
government benefits.114 Notwithstanding the impossibility of procreation
in a marriage, these aspects remained present in and were sufficient to
sustain the fundamental right. 115
Obergefell further detached the right to marry from procreation.116
Neither the ability nor the desire to procreate is requisite to having or
exercising the right to marry. 117 In Obergefell, marriage’s contours
included an exercise of individual autonomy, an intimate expression of
commitment between partners, and service as a bulwark to social order. 118
These aspects of marriage applied to same-sex couples no less than they
applied to heterosexual couples, and as such the former could not be
barred from exercising their fundamental right. 119

111

Id.
See Bratt, supra note 17, at 260 nn.12–16.
113 482 U.S. 78, 95–96 (1987).
114 Id.; see also Maggie Gallagher, Why Marriage Is Good for You, CITY J. (2000),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-marriage-good-you-12002.html [https://perma.cc/93Z2UDTV] (discussing marriage’s many enviable benefits).
115 Turner, 482 U.S. at 95–96; see also Jamal Greene, Divorcing Marriage from Procreation,
114 YALE L.J. 1989, 1996 (2005) (“The Turner [sic] Court had to evaluate whether prisoners—
prisoners!—with no procreative justification still have a fundamental right to marry, and it held
unanimously that they do.”); Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Fundamental Right to Marry:
Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1202 (2004);
Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2014) (invalidating a prohibition on same-sex
marriage in part by reasoning that the state’s position that the right to marry was solely a procreative
interest must be hogwash because that same state granted an exception to its ban on first-cousin
marriage to couples past their reproductive years).
116 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664–68 (2015).
117 Id. at 669 (stating marriage is no “less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have
children,” and rejecting the “ability, desire, or promise to procreate” as a precondition to marriage).
118 Id. at 657, 664–68.
119 Id. But see Tribe, supra note 95, at 30–32 (criticizing the Obergefell Court’s continued
elevation of the right to marry above nonmarital relationships).
112
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State Role in Marriage

All states impose limitations or restrictions on marriage to some
extent,120 and the Supreme Court has recognized states’ particularly wide
sphere of power in the marital scheme. 121 Simultaneously, though, state
power cannot be unlimited if marriage exists as a protected right. 122 As
early as 1877, in Meister v. Moore, the Court recognized this clash. 123 In
Meister, the Court held the state’s power would not be presumed to curtail
traditional forms and methods of marriage because of the great
importance of the right to the individual. 124 Only clear, explicit, and
precise statutory language indicating an intention to and method for
circumscribing marriage might potentially overcome the right. 125
The Obergefell majority went even further. 126 The Court indicated
the established state role may and should be leap-frogged entirely when

120 See generally Shane R. Martins, Consistency Is Key: To Preserve Legislative Intent the IRS
Must Afford Legal Recognition to Non-Marital Relationships in a Post-DOMA World, 15 MARQ.
ELDER’S ADVISOR 245, 258 (2014); Ashby Jones, Why Do We Need the State’s Permission to Get
Married Anyway?, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-LB-23836
[https://perma.cc/XT5M-XTG5].
121 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–67 (1878) (holding, for instance, polygamy
unprotected by the Constitution, the Court wrote, “there cannot be a doubt that . . . it is within the
legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to determine whether polygamy or
monogamy shall be the law of social life under its dominion”). Marriage’s perceived central role
in two critical spheres—ensuring social order and civilization’s continuity—has traditionally been
relied upon to justify state-crafted, localized approaches to matters of family life. Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (“Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having more
to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other institution, has always been subject
to the control of the legislature.”). But see Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 41, 44–45 (2015) (arguing states must get out of the business of marriage).
122 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78–79 (1877) (“Statutes in many of the States, it is true,
regulate the mode of entering into the [marriage] contract, but they do not confer the right.”
(emphasis added)).
123 Meister involved a Michigan statute requiring all valid marriages have a minister or
magistrate present. Id. at 78–79. The Supreme Court held the jury had been erroneously instructed
to disregard all evidence of a common-law marriage between the parties and to determine whether
a marriage existed solely based on the statutory requirements. Id. The Court explained that as a rule
of statutory construction, “formal provisions” of marriage regulation are to be construed as
directives only, indicating how marriages should be performed but not expressly categorizing as
void all other forms of marrying. Id. at 79–83.
124 Id. at 81 (stating that “marriage is a thing of common right”); see also supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
125 The language in the statute at issue failed to satisfy this test. Id. at 81–82; see also Wardle,
supra note 63, at 293. The state’s justification for a statutory intervention must also survive
heightened scrutiny. See infra Section I.C.5.
126 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 677 (2015); see also Yoshino, supra note 93, 168–69
(explaining that marriage negotiates a strange dichotomy as simultaneously a positive right
requiring the state to grant the parties certain recognition and benefits, and a negative right creating
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the state’s legislative power has been abused to suffocate individuals’
access to this fundamental right. 127 The Court construed its role as saving
the right to marry from being subjected to the typical legislative process
if that process itself had been used to illegitimately constrain the right. 128
The Obergefell decision emphasized that the principal aim of the
American political structure was to ensure no arm of government could
deprive individuals of the rights the system was created to protect.129
5.

Standard of Review

Typically, fundamental rights automatically trigger strict scrutiny.130
However, in marriage cases the Court has applied everything from
rational basis review to more searching scrutiny. 131 The Obergefell
development of the equal dignity doctrine untethered the stricter scrutiny
available in standard equal protection cases from a particular protected
class and bound it to the right to marry itself. 132 The right to marry itself
imposes the heavier burden.133
Prior opinions had flirted with increasing the scrutiny stakes in
marriage cases. In Turner, the Court engaged in a reasonableness
discussion but hinted it was looking for something more than rational
basis review.134 The Court insisted on a multi-prong test, requiring the
state to present a “valid” connection between the interest and the
regulation, that no alternative means be available for accomplishing that
end, and that the regulation not be an “exaggerated response” to the state

“a zone of privacy into which the state cannot intrude”). But see Adside, supra note 93 (criticizing
Obergefell as a dramatic departure from the established paradigm that states control marriage).
127 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 676–77 (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that democracy is the
appropriate process for change, so long as that process does not abridge fundamental rights. . . . The
dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await legislative action before
asserting a fundamental right.”).
128 Id. at 679 (“Were the Court to stay its hand to allow slower, case-by-case determination of
the required availability of specific public benefits to same-sex couples, it still would deny gays
and lesbians many rights and responsibilities intertwined with marriage.”).
129 Id. at 674 (construing the Court’s role as “to identify and correct inequalities in the institution
of marriage”); see also Tribe, supra note 95, at 17–20, 28–32.
130 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); see also Wardle, supra note 63, at
325 n.156.
131 Wardle, supra note 63, at 341–42.
132 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675, 681 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the right
to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same sex may not be
deprived of that right and that liberty. . . . [Petitioners] ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law.”).
133 See Tribe, supra note 95, at 20–28.
134 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987).
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interest.135 The Court rejected the state’s position that prisoners’ right to
marry could be impinged because of the valid penological interest in
security where there were “obvious, easy alternatives” to obtain security
without banning marriage. 136 A harsher standard of review than typical
rational basis review was imposed in light of the marriage right
implicated.137 Similarly, Zablocki v. Redhail applied “critical
examination” to the challenged law and demanded a legitimate,
substantial state purpose be produced to support a law that “significantly
discouraged” marriage, a fortiori one that placed an absolute bar on the
right.138
Obergefell avoided announcing reliance on any one level of
scrutiny, appearing instead to apply a malleable balancing test. 139 Though
the Obergefell standard of review is undeniably murky, 140 the approach
recalls that of Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Zablocki.141 There, Justice
Stewart had asserted that where a state interest was based on an uncertain
policy prediction of harms, it was insufficient to defeat a constitutionallyprotected right.142 Obergefell appeared to utilize a similar calculus,143 but
with the addition of putting a leaden finger on the scale in favor of the
individual to intensify the pressure on the states. 144

135

Id.
Id.
137 Metteer, supra note 18, at 270. Cf. Kenji Yoshino, Why the Court Can Strike Down Marriage
Restrictions Under Rational-Basis Review, SCOTUS BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 8:38 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/why-the-court-can-strike-down-marriage-restrictionsunder-rational-basis-review [https://perma.cc/R3L6-558F] (suggesting it is the animus being
expressed toward the class more than the nature of the right itself that primarily guided the
heightened inquiry in certain marriage cases).
138 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 387 n.12 (1978); id. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(contrasting the Zablocki statute’s “intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry”
with the Califano law, which “did not constitute an ‘attempt to interfere with the individual’s
freedom to make a decision as important as marriage,’ and, at most, had an indirect impact on [it].”
(quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 54 (1977))); see also Bratt, supra note 17, at 263–64 n.47;
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 38–39.
139 Adside, supra note 93, at 152–55; see also Yoshino, supra note 93, at 150, 162–74 (finding
Obergefell employed a common-law “balancing methodology”). But see Jack B. Harrison, At Long
Last Marriage, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. P OL’Y & LAW 1, 53–54 (2015) (finding Obergefell
crafted and applied some new heightened scrutiny methodology).
140 Perry, supra note 93, at 6–8 (discussing the oddities of the Obergefell standard of review).
141 434 U.S. at 391–95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
142 Id. (“[I]nvasion of constitutionally protected liberty and the chance of erroneous prediction
are simply too great.”).
143 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 673–75 (2015).
144 Tribe, supra note 95, at 17–23.
136
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ANALYSIS

The cousin bans violate the basic right to marry, which over a
century of Supreme Court jurisprudence has been grounded in both the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.145 This Section will demonstrate that by placing direct
prohibitions or severe limitations on the liberty of a particular identity
group to exercise this fundamental right, the bans trigger a heightened,
stringent form of scrutiny. 146 It will show that the states must prove the
bans are closely tailored means toward accomplishing substantial or
compelling interests.147 It will then review the leading justifications for
the bans and demonstrate that none can vault this constitutional
threshold.148
A.

Triggering the Right to Marry

The cousin bans are classification schemes that intentionally
circumscribe the individual’s freedom to choose who to marry based on
a discrete characteristic,149 namely, the nature and degree of partners’
consanguinity.150 Identity-based regulatory mechanisms raise the
Supreme Court’s suspicion of an unjustified impairment of marriage, and
not only when the laws attack a canonically protected identity group, like
race.151
Laws targeting particular groups for restricted exercise of the
marriage right based on that group identity, regardless of the identity at
issue, have been repeatedly invalidated. 152 Consequently, indigence,153

145

See supra Section I.C.
See infra Section II.A.
147 See infra Sections II.B–II.C.
148 See infra Sections II.B–II.C.
149 An effective analysis of the unconstitutionality of a classification scheme proceeds as
follows: (i) find a legal regime “defined by traits that are irrelevant, in that the trait provides no
basis to deny full rights of citizenship,” and (ii) explain that persons in that class have been “subject
to systematic, irrational discrimination” based on belonging to that identity group. See Bhagwat,
supra note 100, at 395–96.
150 See analysis of the cousin bans, supra Section I.B.1, articulating that the statutes place firstcousinhood status as the barrier to marriage.
151 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation laws).
152 See supra Section I.C.2 for an in-depth description of the concern the Court has shown for
all to have equal access to marriage; accord Bhagwat, supra note 100, at 395–96 (explaining how
equal protection can be applied to far-reaching classification schemes).
153 See generally Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
146
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incarceration,154 and noncustodial single parenthood155 are all identities
for which the Court has intervened in the face of regulations that
significantly restricted access to marriage based on those
characteristics.156 Similarly, sexual orientation was not clearly
categorized as a protected class in Obergefell;157 rather, a gender-based
classification was struck down based on an “equal dignity” doctrine that
all persons enjoy the constitutionally-protected autonomy to pursue a
personally satisfying marriage.158
First cousinhood defines a specific, limited class of persons,159 a
particular identity the states have weaponized 160 for the sole purpose of
invading the marriage right of those in the class.161 One might argue the
cousin bans are not a true marriage-infringing classification scheme as

154 See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); accord Jones v. Perry, 215 F. Supp. 3d
563 (E.D. Ky. 2016) (holding that a requirement for both parties to be physically present when
applying for a marriage license was an unconstitutional infringement of an incarcerated woman ’s
right to marry).
155 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 375 (1978) (“The class is defined by the statute to include
any ‘Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to
support . . . .’”).
156 See supra Section I.C.1.
157 Carl H. Esbeck, A Post-Obergefell America: Is a Season of Legal and Social Strife
Inevitable?, 11 CHRISTIAN LAW. 3 (2015) (“Obergefell did not extend the rigor of the Equal
Protection Clause to ‘sexual orientation’ as a protected class.”). But see Autumn L. Bernhardt, The
Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell Decision: Equal Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25
TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 15–17 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell did apply the standard equal
protection analysis and found sexual orientation a suspect class deserving heightened scrutiny).
158 Yoshino, supra note 93, at 171–79; Tribe, supra note 95, at 17, 23–32.
159 It may be argued that the immutability of race and sexual orientation were relevant to the
heightened protection afforded by those classes, as alluded to by the Obergefell majority. See
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 658 (2015) (“[P]etitioners seek [to marry] . . . [a]nd their
immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to this profound
commitment.”). Conversely, cousinhood is an alterable status. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2119 (amended 2010) (adoption severs familial ties to genetic relatives). However, the immutability
of the classified characteristic has never been made a requisite factor for heightened protection in
the marriage context. See, e.g., Turner, 482 U.S. at 96 (protecting the right to marry of inmates,
“most [of whom] eventually will be released”).
160 “Weaponized” is used intentionally here: scholars have traced the emergence of the cousin
bans to the surging racial and ethnic discrimination in the closing decades of the nineteenth and the
early twentieth centuries, the period in which nearly all the bans were introduced; with first-cousin
marriages more popular among minorities, they were a natural target for animus-motivated
restrictive regulations. Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at 2628; accord Andrew Koppelman,
Beyond Levels of Scrutiny: Windsor and “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1045,
1058 61 (2014) (“Certain legislative classifications are so closely associated with prejudice that
courts presume an illegitimate purpose.”); see infra Section II.B.3 for discussion of the legal
implications of the discriminatory origins of the cousin bans; see also OTTENHEIMER, supra note
19, at 50.
161 See supra Sections I.B.1–I.B.2 for discussion of the ways in which the cousin bans purposely
invade on the right of first cousins to marry.
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they merely limit the right of cousins to marry each other, the states
declaring off-limits only a narrow slice of the general population.162
However, the Supreme Court rejected this rationale in Loving and
Obergefell: the state may not announce that one can marry everyone in
the world except for the individual one wishes to wed. 163 The class of first
cousins may itself be limited, but the right to marry means very little if it
excludes the partner of one’s choosing. 164
The cousin bans directly and significantly interfere with the right to
marry by either absolutely prohibiting or heavily restricting marriage
between first cousins. 165 Those that prohibit first-cousin marriage without
exception—the majority approach166—are directly analogous to the
Loving or Obergefell statutes: the state places an identity, be it race,167
gender,168 or cousinhood,169 as the insurmountable obstacle between
persons seeking to marry.170
Meanwhile, the six jurisdictions that contrive exceptions to general
bans based on age and infertility171 are reminiscent of the prior permission

162 In Keeney v. Heath, the Seventh Circuit suggested the number of persons one is restricted
from marrying may bear on a law’s constitutionality; the larger the prohibited class of potential
partners, the more suspect the law. 57 F.3d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he ratio of male prisoners
to female guards . . . will impair the marital prospects of women far more than those of men.”).
163 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 665 (“A first premise
of the Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent
in the concept of individual autonomy.”).
164 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 958 (Mass. 2003) (citing Perez v.
Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 21 (Cal. 1948)); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
165 See generally supra Section I.B.1.
166 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
167 The Virginia statute in Loving provided that it was a felony for “any white person [to]
intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person [to] intermarry with a white person.”
Loving, 388 U.S. at 4 (quoting Racial Integrity Act of 1924, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59). One’s race
conclusively defined and constrained whom one could marry.
168 Obergefell reviewed four state laws that defined marriage as between a man and a woman.
576 U.S. at 653–54. For instance, the Constitution of Michigan provided that “the union of one
man and one woman in marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage”—clearly
placing one’s gender as the controlling characteristic for marriage. MICH. CONST. of 1963, art. I,
§ 25.
169 See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a full national survey of the cousin bans. The
Delaware statute is representative, providing that “[a] marriage is prohibited and void between a
person and his or her . . . first cousin.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (West 2021). The statutory
language is unequivocal: the degree of consanguinity between partners ineluctably defines their
right to marry.
170 See generally discussion supra Section 1.C.2 of the Court’s approach to direct bars on the
right to marry.
171 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
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provisions the Court invalidated in Zablocki172 and Turner.173 In those
cases, the circumscribed identities—persons delinquent in child support
payments and inmates, respectively—were not by the statutes’ terms
absolutely barred from marriage, but the statutes tied the classified
identities’ access to marriage on obtaining dispensations from designated
state officials.174 Yet, the Court held such requirements were far too
invasive.175 Similarly, the cousin bans with age and infertility exceptions
may peacock as permissive, but practically they function as coercive
prohibitions, with only inflexible time or self-inflicted infertility
releasing the partners from state invasion. 176
The cousin bans with so-called exceptions may intrude even more
substantially than the prior permission cases. The Zablocki and Turner
statutes theoretically kept marriage within grasp of the couple, with the
right immediately exercisable after obtaining state permission. 177 The
cousin bans offer no such quick-release valve: the exceptions merely
subordinate the right to further characteristics of the partners—age,
infertility—inalterable by a simple court order. 178
Having found a direct imposition on marriage based on an identityclassification scheme, the cousin bans must be subjected to a heightened
standard of review, which the Supreme Court applies in its reflexive
protection against encroachments upon the right to marry. 179 The state’s
172 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (requiring noncustodial parent receive court assent
prior to marrying).
173 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (requiring inmates obtain prison warden consent prior
to marrying).
174 Compare Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 375–78 (permitting a noncustodial parent to marry after “first
obtaining a court order granting permission to marry”), with Turner, 482 U.S. at 96 (permitting
inmates to marry provided “the prison superintendent has approved the marriage after finding that
there are compelling reasons for doing so”).
175 Compare Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 (holding prior permission functioned actually as a total
bar for those in the affected class who “either lack the financial means to meet their support
obligations or cannot prove that their children will not become public charges,” “sufficiently
burdened” those who “will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry,” and acted for all
in the class as “a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have held
such freedom to be fundamental”), with Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (interpreting the prior permission
requirement as an “almost complete ban on the decision to marry” by inmates).
176 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
177 The Zablocki and Turner plaintiffs may not have received the necessary permission, but the
statutes were by their terms designed to allow for dispensation. See supra notes 174–175 and
accompanying text.
178 See supra Section I.B.1 for analysis of the varieties of cousin bans. Cf. Metteer, supra note
18, at 269–70 (discussing the Turner Court’s determination that prison officials do need the
autonomy to take action they deem necessary for security purposes—an administrative flexibility
absent in any of the cousin bans).
179 See supra Sections I.C.4–I.C.5; see also Wardle, supra note 63, at 335 (finding the Supreme
Court very rarely overturns state marriage regulations, but where it does, it has been in protection
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burden is particularly heavy given that the intrusion on the right is direct
and intentional.180
B.

Evaluating the State Interests

The questions emerge, then, whether the states can claim a sufficient
interest in placing a direct bar on first cousins’ right to marry, and whether
the bans are closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.181 This
Section will discuss the three leading justifications 182 presented for the
cousin bans: (1) first cousins produce diseased, defective offspring; (2)
in-marrying generates family chaos; and (3) endogamous marriage
impedes the progress of an ordered civilization. Applying the necessary
heightened scrutiny, the Section will weigh whether any of these interests
succeed in raising a compelling interest to support the cousin bans, and
find them all wanting.
1.

Biogenetic Research Empirically Weighs Against the Cousin Bans

The most persistently produced justification for the cousin bans
insists that close kinship between partners portends deleterious genetic
consequences for their offspring. 183 However, the Supreme Court has
suggested that a weakly validated medical concern cannot support a

of an “egregious deprivation of the marriage rights of members of extremely vulnerable, severely
disadvantaged, and politically impotent groups”).
180 See supra Section I.C.5. Recall the issue in Califano was the requirement that marriage be
sufficiently directly impacted to ratchet up the level of scrutiny. See supra note 79 and
accompanying text. The cousin bans clearly meet that test.
181 See supra Section I.C.5.
182 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 42–60; Grossman, supra note 18.
183 See generally Bratt, supra note 17, at 267–81 (discussing the genetic justification in the
context of incest statutes). This horrified response to cousin marriage as genetically dangerous was
captured by Gabriel Garcia Marquez: “They were cousins. . . . [W]hen they expressed their desire
to be married their own relatives tried to stop it. They were afraid that those two healthy products
of two races that had interbred over the centuries would suffer the shame of breeding iguanas.”
GABRIEL GARCIA MARQUEZ, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF SOLITUDE 20 (Gregory Rabassa trans.,
Editorial Sudamericanos 1967). The cousin bans rely on the bio-genetic concern even more so than
incest regulations generally, as the bans emerged only in the period where bio-evolutionary
scientists began seriously considering whether consanguinity is tied to children ’s outcomes.
OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 1–7, 46–55 (attributing the bans in part to the emerging focus on
ideal breeding and superiority by biology, and suggesting that incest laws that emerged prior to
genetic scientific advancements cannot be justified on a contemporary bio-genetic understanding);
see McDonnell, supra note 17, at 352 (arguing the “problems” of the genetic justification).
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statute impairing a fundamental marriage-related right.184 In Skinner v.
Oklahoma, the Court invalidated a mandatory sterilization scheme for
“habitual” criminals, as the state’s interest in avoiding inheritable
criminality was too pseudo-scientific to support the intrusion into the
right to reproduction, 185 which is bound up with the right to marry. 186 The
state must produce sufficient grounds for believing the “definite and
observable characteristics” of a disease are transmissible and likely to
manifest in future generations to justify such a shocking infringement of
a constitutionally-protected right.187 The Court found insufficient
empirical evidence to support the regulation and chastised the state for
playing with eugenics.188
The cousin bans do not clear this threshold, as they impair a
fundamental marriage right despite empirical evidence not weighing
conclusively against a widespread high risk of negative genetics-based
results for the progeny of first cousins.189 Bio-evolutionary scientists have
184 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (“Marriage and procreation are
fundamental . . . . The [state] power to sterilize . . . may have subtle, farreaching [sic] and
devastating effects. . . . Any experiment which the State conducts is to [one’s] irreparable injury.
[One] is forever deprived of a basic liberty.”). But see Cornelia Dean, When Questions of Science
Come to a Courtroom, Truth Has Many Faces, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/science/05law.html
[https://perma.cc/KK9M-SQYH]
(discussing the benefits and pitfalls of the court using science in deciding cases).
185 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42 (“We have not the slightest basis for inferring that . . . the
inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has marked . . . .”).
186 See supra Section I.C.3 for discussion of the scope of the right to marry interpreted to
embody a broad spectrum of activities and interests, with the right to procreation the most basic
and direct of them all.
187 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting the state’s “plan to sterilize the
individual in pursuit of a eugenic plan to eliminate from the race characteristics that are only
vaguely identified and which in our present state of knowledge are uncertain as to
transmissibility”).
188 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541–42 (majority opinion) (warning the sterilization scheme threatened
to “cause races or types . . . inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear”); id. at 544–
45 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (finding neither “common knowledge [n]or experience, [nor] scientific
investigation, has given assurance that the criminal tendencies of any class of habitual offenders
are universally or even generally inheritable” (footnote omitted)); id. at 546 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (criticizing the state). It must be mentioned here that the Court permitted a state’s
compulsory sterilization scheme for persons with mental illness in the notorious Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200 (1927). However, even if accepting Bell as having merit, it set a high bar for how miserable
the genetic odds must be for the Court to validate state interference in the procreation interest. Id.
at 207 (“In view of the general declarations of the Legislature and the specific findings of the Court
obviously we cannot say as matter of law that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist they justify
the result.” (emphasis added)).
189 In his 2012 book, Professor Alan H. Bittles provides a sweeping, in-depth review of the
available studies measuring the deleterious consequences of consanguineous marriage to
conclusively establish the known risks. BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 25. A
fulsome overview of all the data analyzed is outside the scope of this Article, but this section’s
concern—namely, the question of whether reproduction between first cousins produces negatively-
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long established that consanguinity does not cause diathetic 190 tendencies
in offspring;191 rather, the inheritance of two identical mutations of the
same gene causes disease, abnormality, or defect in offspring. 192 The
presence of the same heritable characteristic and recessive gene mutation
in both parents causes heritable or genetic disease in children, not the
degree of kinship between the parents. 193
It has been argued the genetic children of consanguineous couples
are more liable to receive the “double dose” of the mutated gene
necessary for the defect to express itself, 194 as partners of the same
ancestral line are more likely to inherit an identical recessive genetic
mutation from a common ancestor. 195 However, a definitive 2002 report
impacted children—can be summed up by the following conclusion Bittles offers: “Given our
present knowledge of the quite limited adverse effects of consanguinity on health at the population
level . . . it is difficult to discern how laws prohibiting first-cousin marriage can continue to be
required or justified.” Id. at 38. For a comprehensive discussion of the data, see id. chs. 7–11. For
a far briefer discussion of Bittles’ findings, see Why Not Marry Your Cousin? Millions Do,
EUREKALERT!
(Apr.
25,
2012),
https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/508067
[https://perma.cc/M75M-6MZW] (quoting Bittles as stating that there is a mere 3 to 4% higher risk
of illness and early death in children of consanguineous couples above the general population and
that “the risks apply primarily to couples who are carriers of disorders that are normally very, very
rare,” while “[f]or over 90% of cousin marriages, their risk [of having a child with a genetic
abnormality] is the same as it is for the general population” (second alteration in original)).
190 Derived of the word diathesis, meaning “permanent (hereditary or acquired) condition of the
body which renders it liable to certain special diseases or affections.” Diathesis, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (2020).
191 LESLIE A. W HITE, THE SCIENCE OF CULTURE 305 (1949) (“[I]nbreeding intensifies the
inheritance of traits, good or bad. If the offspring of a union . . . are inferior it is because the parents
were of inferior stock . . . .” (emphasis added)). Please note that the quoted language here, as well
as in other citations using older sources found in this Article, may be offensive to modern readers.
Their inclusion should not be taken as an endorsement of those eugenicist views.
192 See Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24, at 91–95; accord Bratt, supra note 17, at 267–81.
193 A medical journal excerpt over a century old remains an accurate assessment: “If the cousins
have behind them an ancestry physically, morally, and mentally without blemish, then such a
marriage is certainly unobjectionable and may even be regarded as advantageous. . . . It is, we
think, quite clear that any dogmatic condemnation of cousin marriages is not warranted by the
present state of knowledge.” Hospital Finance: Cousin Marriage, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 164 (1910).
194 See Bratt, supra note 17, at 271. Note that, on average, any child born of any parents who
are both carriers for the same genetic disease has a one-in-four chance of manifesting the disease.
Genetic Disorders: Carrier Screening, NORTON & ELAINE SARNOFF CTR. FOR JEWISH GENETICS,
https://www.juf.org/cjg/Carrier-Screening.aspx [https://perma.cc/S7JU-25PE]. In fact, most
humans carry at least one recessive genetic mutation with the potential to cause infant death or to
manifest in severe genetic defect should two copies of the same mutation be inherited. Ziyue Gao,
Darrel Waggoner, Matthew Stephens, Carole Ober & Molly Przeworski, An Estimate of the
Average Number of Recessive Lethal Mutations Carried by Humans, 199 GENETICS 1243, 1252
(2015). Less than one percent of humanity carries no recessive genetic mutations. See Bratt, supra
note 17, at 271 n.78. Consequently, nearly without exception, every incident of reproduction carries
a risk that resulting offspring will manifest a genetic disease recessive and latent in the parents. Id.
195 See generally Alan H. Bittles, Inbreeding in Human Populations and its Influence on
Fertility and Health, 27 J. BIOLOGICAL EDUC. 260 (1993); see also Bittles, Consanguinity, supra
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by the National Society of Genetic Counselors (NSGC) reviewing and
consolidating the research of many consanguinity studies196 debunked the
theory that first cousins as a class pose an appreciably greater risk of
passing on the genetic defect to their offspring.197 The risk for congenital
defects in the offspring of first cousins was approximately three percent
above the population background risk. 198 The stigma associated with
cousin marriage in the United States was rejected as having “little
biological basis.”199 Routine genetic counseling and testing for family
planning purposes was recommended,200 with the solitary supplemental
testing suggested being one neonatal screening for inherited metabolic
note 24, at 91–95; Bennett et al., supra note 13, at 114–15. Analogously, communities that are
historically highly endogamous, where there are a very small number of ancestors of the general
population, have a statistically increased probability of sharing identical genes—and the identical
genetic mutations that come with it. The smaller antecedent gene pool increases the possibility that
the problematic gene may be inherited by both partners from a mutual ancestor. Bittles,
Consanguinity, supra note 24, at 91–95; see also Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at 2629 (discussing
genetic disease in the British-Pakistani community). Of course, researchers have by now concluded
that all humans have descended from a small ancestral population, making us all, ultimately, the
products of one in-marrying family of overlapping genetic code. Boyce Rensberger, Human
Ancestors
Traced
to
1
Small
Group,
WASH. POST
(May
26,
1995),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/26/human-ancestors-traced-to-1small-group/5a5a1a80-3cfe-4b68-b6ac-d1144e402293 [https://perma.cc/38AK-JUD4]; see Lev A.
Zhivotovsky, Noah A. Rosenberg & Marcus W. Feldman, Features of Evolution and Expansion of
Modern Humans, Inferred from Genomewide Microsatellite Markers, 72 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
1171 (2003).
196 It must be noted that many reports warning of greatly increased genetic risk in first-cousin
reproduction have been criticized as infected by confirmation bias. See, e.g., Alan H. Bittles,
Consanguineous Marriages and Congenital Anomalies, 382 LANCET 1316, 1316–17 (2013)
(criticizing studies associating consanguineous marriage with congenital anomalies as “hampered
by deficiencies in study design and small sample sizes”). Researchers spanning the nineteenth to
the twenty-first centuries have been guilty of concluding, against all data they personally collect,
that cousinhood is the root cause of childhood disease. OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 82–85
(reporting on Scotland’s deputy commissioner for lunacy maintaining that cousin marriages create
“idiots, madmen, cripples, and mutes,” even as the commissioner’s studies throughout the 1850s
repeatedly failed to conform to his hypothesis). Critically, studies of consanguineous-born children
have often failed to account for the effects of socioeconomic variables on infant health, mortality,
and childhood disease. Bennett et al., supra note 13, at 102; BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN
CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 226–27 (“In a majority of consanguinity studies there continues to be
no credible control for non-genetic variables, even in the investigation of complex disorders in
which social and ‘environmental’ factors are known to operate.”). These factors likely play a
pronounced causative role in determining the health of children born to first cousins, as cousin
marriage occurs heavily in communities where healthcare access is of acute concern and where
pregnant women are less likely than the general population to engage in prenatal testing or
pregnancy termination. Id.; Gao et al., supra note 194, at 1244; Paul & Spencer, supra note 25, at
2628–29. The issue is health care, education, and access, not consanguinity.
197 See generally Bennett et al., supra note 13.
198 Id. at 115.
199 Id. at 116.
200 Id.
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disorders, which are relatively common among newborns. 201 Data
compiled in 2012 concurred with the NSGC study, showing a small
minority of first-cousin offspring have a low, single-digit greater risk of
certain defects than their non-consanguineous peers. 202
The courts have adopted the view that the alleged health risks
associated with reproduction between first cousins are insufficiently
proven to support the bans.203 The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Estate of
Loughmiller, recognized a first-cousin marriage legally solemnized in a
foreign jurisdiction despite the state’s cousin ban. 204 The court rejected
the genetic science as simply too uncertain to justify a theory of
detrimental inbreeding,205 and it refused to abrogate the normative comity
rule of recognizing marriages conducted legally out of state. 206 Similarly,

201 Morteza Pourfarzam & Fouzieh Zadhoush, Newborn Screening for Inherited Metabolic
Disorders; News and Views, 18 J. RSCH. MED. SCIS. 801, 801 (2013) (“Each disorder is
individually rare, but their cumulative incidence is relatively high, around 1 in 1500 to 1 in 5000
live births.”); Edinen Asuka, Donald Jeanmonod & Rebecca Jeanmonod, Inborn Errors of
Metabolism, NAT ’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK459183 [https://perma.cc/L356-DACZ] (noting that these disorders can be inherited as both
autosomal recessive mutations or as autosomal dominant and X-linked mutations).
202 BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 226–29 (“First-cousin marriage
has been legal in England and Wales since the sixteenth century, apparently without imposing
significant dysgenic effects on the population.”) (internal citation omitted).
203 See, e.g., In re Est. of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1981); cf. Mazzolini v. Mazzolini,
155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958) (finding no reason “shocking to good morals [or] unalterably
opposed to a well defined public policy” that warranted voiding a first-cousin marriage); Garcia v.
Garcia, 127 N.W. 586, 589 (S.D. 1910) (concluding that there was no reason to void a valid firstcousin marriage, an extreme move that would have unnecessarily caused “very serious”
consequences for children of the marriage in trusts and estates and criminal law). Interestingly, the
cousin bans bear a marked similarity to erstwhile state statutes barring persons with a physical or
mental “inferiority” from marrying, reproducing, or engaging in sexual intercourse. GROSSMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 51, at 39–42. Some of these classifications were based on conditions genetic
and hereditable, others on conditions contracted and treatable. Id. These included prohibitions on
persons with epilepsy from marrying and requiring men to obtain medical certificates affirming
they were free of venereal diseases before they could receive marriage licenses. Id. at 40–41. By
the turn of the last century, most laws restricting marriage based on supposed health concerns had
been repealed. Id. at 42. Cousin bans are among the holdouts.
204 629 P.2d at 157–60.
205 Id. at 158 (“[I]nbreeding is thought to cause a weakening of the racial and physical quality
of the population according to the science of eugenics . . . [but] there are opposing views regarding
the effects of inbreeding from first-cousin marriages.”).
206 Id. (“The general rule with regard to the recognition of marriages solemnized elsewhere is
that if the marriage is valid where contracted, it is valid everywhere.”); accord Mazzolini, 155
N.E.2d at 208 (“The policy of the law is to sustain marriages, where they are not incestuous . . . .
[S]exual relations between cousins are not incestuous. . . . [W]e are persuaded to [uphold the
marriage].”); see also Storke, supra note 55, at 493–97 (discussing conflict of laws issues arising
with conflicting cousin marriage regulations); see generally P. H. Vartanian, Annotation,
Recognition of Foreign Marriage as Affected by Policy in Respect of Incestuous Marriage s, 117
A.L.R. 186 (1938) (discussing recognition of foreign marriage when challenged by the forum state).
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the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in Ghassemi v. Ghassemi found the
bans pursued no legitimate state concern for the creation of diseased
children.207
2.

Cousin Bans Do Not Forestall Family Chaos

A second justification for the cousin bans is avoidance of family
chaos.208 Permitting marriage between close relatives would undermine a
precious safety found only in the camaraderie of asexual family ties. 209
Relations between near kin likely involve coercion, abuse, 210
psychological trauma, and social stigmatization, for those in the
relationship and their families.211
While this justification may have some weight for marriage between
a parent and their child or between siblings, it is inapplicable to first
cousins.212 The Loughmiller and Ghassemi courts vociferously dismissed
the notion that sociological consequences of oversexualizing the family

207 998 So. 2d 731, 748 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that as “first cousins may legally cohabitate,
have intimate relations, and even produce children,” the state could not claim production of children
as the risk it guarded against).
208 Metteer, supra note 18, at 276–78.
209 41 AM. JUR. 2D Incest § 1 (2020) (“The laws against incest are designed to protect the
integrity of the family and the welfare of minor children . . . .”); McDonnell, supra note 17, at 353;
J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Criminal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41, 104 n.338 (2011) (“The
harm of adult incest seems speculative but plausible: If close relatives (cousins) or people raised
together (siblings by affinity) could engage in sex once they became adults, the family as a sexually
‘safe’ place would be undermined.” (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence
of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021,
1090 (2004))).
210 See generally Zhou, supra note 17, at 239–41. Even those who have argued the
constitutionality of prohibitions on parent-child or sibling incest do not deny the profoundly
damaging consequences of those relationships but rather argue that there are better methods of
ensuring such harm is not inflicted upon a person. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 289–91.
211 Metteer, supra note 18, at 274–78; Richard P. Kluft, Ramifications of Incest, PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/sexual-offenses/ramifications-incest
[https://perma.cc/M4AC-KEEV] (asserting that sex between relatives “often leads to traumatic
bonding, . . . abuse, threats, intimidation, beatings, humiliations, and harassment”); Dorothy
Willner, Definition and Violation: Incest and the Incest Taboos, 18 MAN 134, 139–50 (1983)
(discussing the trauma, stigma, and damage to self-identity wrought by incest between parentschildren and siblings).
212 Moore, supra note 18, at 147 (“[C]ivilized society is based upon the institution of the family
and . . . consanguineous mating constitutes a threat to this institution . . . . This contention would
doubtlessly have merit were it restricted to mating within the immediate family . . . but it loses its
force when applied to cousin-marriages.”); see also Grossman, supra note 18 (“[I]t is fairly unusual
for first cousins to grow up in close confines.”).
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were relevant to first-cousin unions.213 Both courts cited their respective
state legislatures’ glaring omissions of sexual intercourse between first
cousins from their definitions of “incest” as particularly persuasive
evidence that family harmony could not be the basis for the cousin ban.214
In State v. Couvillion, the Supreme Court of Louisiana relied on the fact
that first cousins share a “remote relationship,” unlike nuclear relatives,
in upholding a marriage despite a cousin ban. 215 The Indiana Court of
Appeals in Mason v. Mason similarly found no public policy had been
articulated in support of that state’s cousin ban. 216 The conclusions of the
Kansas, Louisiana, and Indiana courts are supported by the research into
the reasons why incest is harmful. 217
213 In re Est. of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156, 158–61 (Kan. 1981) (raising and rejecting
prevention of “the sociological consequences of competition for sexual companionship among
family members” as irrelevant to cousin marriage); Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d 731, 747–
48 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (“[W]e reiterate that in finding no violation of a strong public policy, we
make a clear distinction between the marriage of first cousins and marriages contracted between
more closely-related collaterals.”).
214 Loughmiller, 629 P.2d at 161 (finding the alleged odiousness of cousin marriage “has
become less compelling in recent years as evidenced by the legislature’s omission of sexual
intercourse between first cousins in the definition of incest”); Ghassemi, 998 So. 2d at 748 (“Our
recognition of this distinction [between first cousins and closer kin] is further buttressed by the fact
that relations between first cousins are not encompassed by our criminal incest statute . . . .”);
accord Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958) (“The policy of the law is to
sustain marriages, where they are not incestuous, polygamous, shocking to good morals,
unalterably opposed to a well defined public policy, or prohibited.” The court found first cousins
failed to rise to that level.).
215 42 So. 431, 431 (La. 1906). First cousins largely are not raised in one household, and do not
hold themselves out as and are not perceived to be family of one nuclear household. Accord
Metteer, supra note 18, at 275; see also D’vera Cohn & Jeffrey S. Passel, A Record 64 Million
Americans Live in Multigenerational Households, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/05/a-record-64-million-americans-live-inmultigenerational-households [https://perma.cc/QBZ7-ABWH] (noting the rise of two adult
generation households, i.e., parents living with their adult children, not a rise in multiple lines of
extended family living under one roof). But see Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496–
500 (1977) (striking down as a violation of due process a zoning ordinance excluding first cousins
from the “family” category that may reside together). Importantly, though, Moore did not hold that
first cousins must be defined as family of one household; rather, the decision focused on the
importance of permitting families to make such determinations for themselves. Id. at 504–06.
216 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The Indiana court’s reasoning rested in part,
regrettably, on contrasting the cousin ban with the policy support for the state’s then-operative
prohibition on same-sex marriage. Id.
217 For instance, an insurmountably asymmetrical power dynamic inherently exists between
parents and children, but first cousins are typically in equal positions of authority relative to one
another within the family structure. Mariam Alizade, Incest: The Damaged Psychic Flesh, in ON
INCEST : PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES 106–08 (Giovanna Ambrosio ed., 2005) (discussing the
repercussions of incest). Meanwhile, romance between siblings is rife with potential trauma, but
first cousins’ dynamic may be more analogous to childhood friends than siblings. Cf. Metteer, supra
note 18, at 275–78; ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE VICAR OF BULLHAMPTON 136 (1870) (“Cousins
probably know all or most of your little family secrets. Cousins, perhaps, have romped with you,
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The family harmony justification recalls the pre-Obergefell
argument that the state may ban same-sex marriage based on its belief
that the nuclear family unit is best served by heterosexual marriage. 218 In
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts found even rational basis review unsatisfied by this
argument.219 The Supreme Court in Obergefell took a dim view of the
rationale, as well. 220 Family stability is similarly unthreatened, and
actually possibly promoted, by cousin marriage, as demonstrated in
studies of communities where cousin marriage has been widely
practiced.221
3.

The Fabric of Society Is Not Threatened

The third justification proposes first-cousin marriage visits harm
upon society at large. 222 The theory claims that marriage between nonkin, or exogamy, promotes social cohesion by forcing intergroup
alliances, increasing humanity’s ability to survive, while in-marriage, or
endogamy, reinforces humans’ natural tribalism. 223 A civilization’s

and scolded you, and teased you, when you were young. Cousins are almost the same as brothers,
and yet they may be lovers. There is certainly a great relief in cousinhood.”).
218 See Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 57–67, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. 01-1647-A).
219 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961–69.
220 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 738–39 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (relying on the
state’s argument for heterosexual marriage being the ideal family unit, which had failed to convince
the majority).
221 Moore, supra note 18, at 147; Bennett et al., supra note 13, at 113. These studies show that
cousin marriage increases economic stability by retaining property within the family and
strengthens emotional ties across branches of the extended family. Id.; see also Kuper, supra note
24, at 728–30; TALIA SCHAFFER, ROMANCE’S RIVAL: FAMILIAR MARRIAGE IN VICTORIAN
FICTION 123 (2016) (arguing that cousin marriage, a popular trope in Victorian literature,
empowered women to engage with the public world while “reinforcing and consolidating family
ties that may have been frayed”). First-cousin marriages also result in simplified, smoother wedding
arrangements, and more congenial post-marital dynamics. Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24, at
91. These benefits have been recognized by communities as diverse and widespread as South
Indians, Burmese Chin and Kachin, Siberian Gilyaks, Australian Aborigines, and Victorian
English. Kuper, supra note 24, at 724–28. Rather than worrying society might discover a dirty
secret of a first-cousin couple in the family, many communities have pursued these matches as
ideal. See generally Bittles, Consanguinity, supra note 24.
222 Moore, supra note 18, at 147; see also Metteer, supra note 18 at 273 (“The states’ interests
are . . . to protect society at large from the effects of incest, rather than to protect the individuals
involved from the effects of their incestuous liaisons.”).
223 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 134–44. This formulation, known as the “alliance theory,”
is described by CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP 21–51
(James Harle Bell, John Richard von Sturmer & Rodney Needham trans., Beacon Press 1969), who
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success in refraining from indiscriminate intimacy with relatives
purportedly signifies progressive human evolution beyond barbarism and
savagery.224
The Chancery Court of New York in Wightman v. Wightman—
decided in 1820, decades before cousin bans were introduced anywhere
in the country—challenged the wisdom of this theory of consanguineous
marriage.225 Relying on common law, natural law, and ecclesiastic law,
the court concluded that while marriage within the nuclear family may be
per se repugnant, marriage between further relatives, like cousins, could
not be called de facto detrimental to society and could reasonably be left
to personal determinations. 226
Following the introduction of the cousin bans, courts have continued
to recognize cousin marriage as innocuous.227 In Etheridge v. Shaddock,
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, when validating a marriage despite the
state’s cousin ban, announced it was adopting the majority view in
finding cousin marriage to be an innocent form of consanguineous
unions.228 Similarly, in Schofield v. Schofield, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania validated a cousin marriage legally celebrated elsewhere
because it found no basis to consider such a marriage harmful and
necessary to be voided.229 The long history of cousin marriage as
practiced successfully across cultures and the socioeconomic gamut
demonstrates the accuracy of the judiciary’s view that first-cousin
marriage does not endanger social progress; in fact, it boasts stabilizing
effects.230
imagines the incest taboo as a man-made ideal upon which a modern, cohesive, thriving society is
founded.
224 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 134–48. This principle is tied to the bio-genetic
justification, as the end of indiscriminate sex leads to more careful selection of reproductive
partners and conception of stronger offspring. Id.
225 4 Johns. Ch. 343 (N.Y. Ch. 1820) (holding void the marriage of a “lunatic”).
226 Id. at 347–51 (rejecting parent-child and sibling relationships as “monstrous connections,
and repugnant to the law of nature . . . binding on all mankind”). The Wightman court concluded
line-drawing between further relatives should be left “to the injunctions of religion, and to the
control of manners and opinion.” Id. at 351. The court did leave the door open for the legislature to
replace individual choice on non-nuclear consanguineous marriage. Id. Of course, this Article
argues for a constitutional approach.
227 See generally Storke, supra note 55, at 493–97.
228 706 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Ark. 1986) (“[A] marriage between first cousins . . . does not create
‘much social alarm,’ so that the marriage will be recognized if it was valid by the law of the state
in which it took place.”).
229 51 Pa. Super. 564, 578 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1901) (“[T]his act cannot be taken as a declaration
that the marriage status between first cousins is either contrary to the Divine law or immoral.”).
230 For example, immigrant communities have found cousin marriage to be integral to their
continuity, ensuring propagation of valued and valuable cultural beliefs and social traits. See Kuper,
supra note 24, at 732–33; see also OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 151–52; BITTLES,
CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 58–73; see generally supra Section I.A.1.
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This entire theory of cousin marriages as anathema to social progress
carries a distinctly discriminatory mien. 231 In Loving v. Virginia, the
Supreme Court rejected anti-miscegenation regulation because of its
basis in the white supremacist project.232 The cousin bans share that torrid
history, arising in the same era as the anti-miscegenation regulations and
in response to similar anti-minority sentiment.233 For instance, the alleged
affinity Native Americans had for cousin marriage was cited by cousin
ban agitators to advance their cause. 234 Like the anti-miscegenation laws,
the cousin bans persist under the guise of maintaining social progress, but
function as a pretext for a machine of discrimination. 235 The cousin bans
restrict marriage based on an irrelevant characteristic, for reasons
motivated by at best ignorance and at worst bigotry. 236
C.

The Bans Are Not Closely Tailored

The justifications undergirding the cousin bans are extremely weak
on their merits,237 but even assuming they represent some legitimately
valuable state interests, the cousin bans fail when scrutinized for whether
they are closely tailored to meet only those purposes.238 The Supreme
231 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 50, 139–44 (discussing the wholly modern and wellfunctioning societies that have practiced cousin marriage); Zhou, supra note 17, at 198–200 (noting
the alliance theory has been criticized as promoting outdated social norms and gendered roles).
232 388 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1967); Dorothy E. Roberts, Loving v. Virginia as a Civil Rights Decision,
59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 191 (2015) (“According to the Court’s reasoning, the Virginia law
violated the equal protection clause not simply because it employed racial classifications, but
because its racial classification system furthered the state’s impermissible white supremacist
mission.”). Indeed, the Loving Court cites two notorious World War II opinions—Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), overruled
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018)—upholding regulations persecuting JapaneseAmericans based on the proposition that racial classification schemes are not de facto
unconstitutional. 388 U.S. at 11.
233 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
234 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 50.
235 See id. at 51–56; see Bratt, supra note 17, at 276–81; see also I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best
Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1209–10 (2012).
236 BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 38–39 (arguing that the U.S.
cousin bans may run afoul of international human rights law protecting the right to marry). The
discriminatory reasoning for limiting first-cousin marriage is reminiscent of the now-refuted
arguments put forth against same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage and the
Constitution: What the Court Said and Why It Got It Wrong, REAL CLEAR P OL. (July 3, 2015),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/07/03/marriage_and_the_constitution_what_the_
court_said_and_why_it_got_it_wrong_127220.html [https://perma.cc/S2PK-2ERX] (discussing
the unconstitutionality of limiting marriage based on “irrelevant” characteristics).
237 See supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3.
238 As is required by the legal standard for examining impairments of the right to marry. See
supra Section I.C.5.
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Court requires the state to justify the nature and scope of the means
employed to regulate marriage, and demands tempered, logical responses
to valid objectives with no alternative means.239
1.

The Bans Go Too Far and Not Far Enough to Serve the Biogenetic
Interest

Assuming, then, that the state may legitimately be intolerant of any
increased risk of disease to potential offspring—even less than three
percent240—the bans must prove to be measured, finely-honed tools
toward eliminating that risk. They are not. 241
First, the bans are overinclusive, as they cover the roughly ninetythree percent of cousin couples who will have children without any risk
of defect.242 Second, they are underinclusive on two fronts: (1) they
prohibit marriage, which may deter but surely does not prevent children
from being born to first cousins,243 and (2) they tolerate unrestricted
marriage, sex, cohabitation, and reproduction between persons who pose
much higher risks to offspring than first cousins. 244 To that latter point,245
no state prohibits marriage or criminalizes intercourse with women over

239 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (“When a statutory classification significantly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests.”);
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 97–98 (1987) (overturning a regulation that “represents an
exaggerated response” to legitimate concerns where “[t]here are obvious, easy alternatives”).
240 See supra Section II.B.1.
241 See Bennett et al., supra note 13; Grossman, supra note 18 (discussing the over and underinclusiveness of the cousin bans).
242 Grossman, supra note 18.
243 See generally George A. Akerlof & Janet L.Yellen, An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Births in
the United States, BROOKINGS INST. (Aug. 1, 1996), https://www.brookings.edu/research/ananalysis-of-out-of-wedlock-births-in-the-united-states [https://perma.cc/89YQ-YSHA] (presenting
the data of rising numbers of babies born outside of marriage in the United States, and the policy
implications of this trend). Compare Courtney G. Joslin, Discrimination In and Out of Marriage,
98 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing against the hegemony marriage enjoys over nonmarriage
relationships in America), with Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: What It Is, Why It Matters, and the
Consequences of Redefining It, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 11, 2013), http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_
media/2013/pdf/bg2775.pdf [https://perma.cc/ES5K-R6N9] (mounting a defense of marriage as an
institution with proven benefits).
244 See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text.
245 BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra note 25, at 228–29 (comparing the low risks
of first-cousin reproduction to the significantly increased dangers inherent in both geriatric
pregnancies and as a result of alcohol consumption during pregnancy).
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thirty-five,246 between individuals with autosomal dominant disorders,247
and among members of certain ethnicities 248—yet all those groups
present risks of genetic disease in offspring substantially higher than first
cousins.249 The bans function as clumsily as the statute invalidated in
Turner, barring marriage by a class in an attempt to protect a legitimate
social welfare interest, but empirically missing its mark by failing to
target the issue that statistically poses the greatest risk. 250
The Maine statute may be the narrowest in scope251 of the bans,
demanding proof of attending mandatory genetic counseling as the

246 Having a Baby After Age 35, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS (July 2018),
https://www.acog.org/womens-health/faqs/having-a-baby-after-age-35-how-aging-affectsfertility-and-pregnancy [http://perma.cc/8UUL-4A7M]; see also Bratt, supra note 17, at 274–75.
247 LISTER HILL NAT ’L CTR. FOR BIOMEDICAL COMMC’NS ET AL., HELP ME UNDERSTAND
GENETICS: INHERITING GENETIC CONDITIONS 20–22 (2016), https://www.medschool.lsuhsc.edu/
lungcancer/docs/Help%20me%20understand%20genetics_ingeriting%20genetic%20conditions_
genetics%20home%20reference_booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/H45Z-8Q6X]. For instance, there is
a one-in-two chance a child of partners who are both carriers of recessive genes of autosomal
dominant disorders, like cystic fibrosis or Huntington’s disease, will manifest the disease. Id.; see
also CF Genetics: The Basics, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., https://www.cff.org/What-is-CF/
Genetics/CF-Genetics-The-Basics [http://perma.cc/M7E7-56RQ]; Who Is at Risk, HUNTINGTON’S
DISEASE SOC’Y AM., https://hdsa.org/what-is-hd/history-and-genetics-of-huntingtons-disease/
who-is-at-risk [http://perma.cc/N39E-9JLV].
248 Some genetic conditions appear as much as twenty to one hundred times more frequently
among Jews of Central and Eastern European descent than they do in the rest of the population.
One in thirty Ashkenazic Jews carry the recessive gene for Tay-Sachs disease, a devastating fatal
nerve disorder in infancy that carries a three- to six-month life expectancy. Robert Graboyes, DNA
and the Shadowland of Ethics, NEWSDAY (Apr. 25, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://www.newsday.com/
opinion/commentary/dna-testing-genes-ethics-1.18255356 [https://perma.cc/T5HJ-9JD3].
249 See supra notes 242–244 and accompanying text. In a perverse twist, it has also been
suggested that if first cousins do, in fact, birth diseased children at increased rates, the states’ biogenetic interest may be better served by permitting the marriages because research demonstrates
diseased children are less likely to reproduce, allowing the “bad” gene to be more quickly
eradicated and future genetic disease avoided altogether. See generally OTTENHEIMER, supra note
19, at 116–33 (discussing at length the biogenetics of cousin marriage); McDonnell, supra note 17,
at 353. Of course, this theory raises to the fore the evil lurking close to the surface of the cousin
bans: eugenics. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 276–81; see also Cohen, supra note 235, at 1209–10
(2012). With their bans, states communicate the supremacist message that government may wield
its power to intervene in the birth of defective children, telegraphing to children that genetic
difference renders their lives not worth living. Bratt, supra note 17, at 276–81; see also I. Glenn
Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 447,
500 (2011).
250 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court had found the marriage regulation to be ineffectual
in obtaining the interest in prison safety, 482 U.S. 78, 97–100 (1987), while the cousin bans target
a class that poses no genetic threat. See Metteer, supra note 18, at 274–75; Bratt, supra note 17, at
280–81.
251 The five states that permit marriage where the couple is old or infertile may already be in
active violation of the right to privacy. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 661–62 (7th Cir. 2014) (“It
would be considered an invasion of privacy to condition the eligibility of a heterosexual couple to
marry on whether both prospective spouses were fertile (although later we’ll see Wisconsin flirting
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prerequisite to marriage.252 Yet, this fails close tailoring, as well. First, to
logically and effectively accomplish a genetics-focused goal, Maine must
require that all marriage license applicants seek genetic counseling, not
only first cousins.253 Second, Maine has impermissibly erected what
amounts to an economic toll on the right to marry by forcing couples to
pay for genetic counseling as a gateway to marriage,254 a mechanism the
Supreme Court found in Zablocki v. Redhail and Boddie v. Connecticut
to be an illegitimate barrier to accessing the right. 255
Finally, the biogenetic justification wrongly suggests the right to
marry is confined to its procreative function, a view the Supreme Court
has expressly rejected.256 The right to marry includes matters of personal
significance and fulfillment, independent of a desire or ability to
procreate.257 Those elements of marriage—support, commitment,
government benefits258—are desirable and achievable by first cousins as
much as any other couple. 259

with such an approach with respect to another class of infertile couples) [i.e., the state’s cousin ban
with a fertility exception].”).
252 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701(2)(B) (2021). The Maine restriction stands in stark
contrast to all other cousin bans, as it allows marriage between first cousins at any age so long as
they seek genetic counseling, an educational exercise, while all the other statutes with exceptions
require actual certifications of infertility to be presented before a court. See the lengthy discussion
of each permutation of a cousin ban supra Section I.B.1. However, as discussed here, even the
Maine regulation invades the right to marry arbitrarily and discriminatorily.
253 Moore, supra note 18, at 148 (proposing that regulation of marriage between individuals
with inheritable defects, not a senseless ban on first-cousin marriage, would be the method to
accomplish a genetics-based goal).
254 Genetic counseling is sometimes covered by insurance, but that may exclude exorbitant
specialist fees and travel costs, while testing itself can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars,
rendering the entire process very costly. What is the Cost of Genetic Testing, and How Long Does
It Take to Get the Results?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (last updated July 28, 2021),
https://medlineplus.gov/genetics/understanding/testing/costresults
[https://perma.cc/N6EUNBDV]; How Much Does Genetic Testing Cost for Pregnancy?, GENOME MED.,
https://www.genomemedical.com/genetic-testing-pregnancy/cost
[https://perma.cc/DYR4GR7D].
255 Compare 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978), with 401 U.S. 371, 380–83 (1971). A potential cure for
this defect is for the state to subsidize voluntary counseling and testing for marriage license
applicants. A model may be found in the Jewish community’s self-regulating effort to eradicate the
recurrence of incurable diseases particularly common in their ethnic group via the creation of
genetic compatibility screening programs for potential spouses. See Graboyes, supra note 248.
256 See supra Section I.C.3.
257 See supra notes 112–119 and accompanying text.
258 See generally Greene, supra note 115.
259 Cousin bans with exceptions for age or infertility, see generally supra Section I.B.1, do
appear to at least acknowledge the existence of other facets of marriage, with the state’s only
concern being the supposed genetic risk.
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Better Alternatives Already Exist for Protecting the Family

The interest in intra-family harmony cannot survive close tailoring,
either. First, the state tolerates many activities which arguably pose a
danger to family harmony, making the bans underinclusive. 260 Second,
the bans do not systematically protect against coercive relationships or
child abuse, which are extensively regulated by setting statutory ages of
consent for marriage and sex, and criminalizing child abuse and rape.261
These are extant mechanisms directly intended to ensure no one, blood
relative or otherwise, leverages an intimate relationship for traumatic
ends.262
3.

Society Is Neither Served nor Controlled by the Bans

The bans do not truly advance the theory that effectuating social
progress requires exogamy. Actual adherence to that rule would demand
a bar on all intra-ethnic marriage, i.e., no partners of any shared cultural
or racial backgrounds should be permitted to marry in the interest of
preventing tribalism. 263
Further, if the concern is to weaken intrafamily bonds in favor of
interfamily mixing, first-cousin cohabitation must also be prohibited, yet
it is largely permitted. 264 That discrepancy—prohibiting marriage but
allowing cohabitation—motivated the Board of Immigration Appeals in
Matter of Hirabayashi to conclude the jurisdiction in question could not
claim any powerful social good was being advanced by its marriage
prohibition.265 In Ghassemi v. Ghassemi, the Louisiana court discussed at
length what appeared to it as the complete ineffectiveness of the cousin
260 For example, there is ongoing research into the effects of pornography on relationships, but
the creation and distribution of pornography remains largely unregulated in recognition of First
Amendment protections. David Ludden, How Porn Affects Relationships, PSYCH. TODAY (Aug.
25, 2020), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-apes/202008/how-porn-affectsrelationships [https://perma.cc/4U6J-6TC6]; Shankar Vedantam, Researchers Explore
Pornography’s Effect on Long-Term Relationships, NPR (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
10/09/556606108/research-explores-the-effect-pornography-has-on-long-term-relationships
[https://perma.cc/88XP-K9V9]; Thomas C. Arthur, The Problems with Pornography Regulation:
Lessons from History, 68 EMORY L.J. 867 (2019). The contours of the pro- and anti-pornography
movements are beyond the scope of this Article; the relevant point is that there are no widespread,
wholesale statutory prohibitions on the consumption of pornography in an effort to supposedly save
romantic partners from themselves.
261 Id. See Bratt, supra note 17, at 288–96.
262 Id. at 288–96.
263 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 134–37.
264 See supra Sections I.B.1–I.B.2.
265 10 I. & N. Dec. 722 (B.I.A. 1964).
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bans at advancing any legitimate societal interest, given that cousins
remained permitted to live together, have sex, and bear children. 266
Finally, if social cohesion is the intended effect of the bans, the state
has failed abysmally. 267 The bans subject first-cousin couples to
stigmatization for behavior that courts and most of the globe believe
unworthy of opprobrium, harming rather than furthering societal unity.268
D.
1.

Counterargument

Federalism and Line-Drawing

The bans may yet be defended by relying on principles of
federalism, which suggest marriage regulation normatively fluctuates
between states.269 Just as we trust the states to legislate a permissible age
for marriage, so too the acceptable level of kinship between partners. 270
The Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor appeared to lend
credence to this view by noting that states tolerate varying degrees of
consanguinity, specifically remarking that a “handful” of states prohibit
first-cousin marriage.271 However, Windsor likely referenced the cousin
bans innocuously, merely as an example of regulatory realities, rather
than to settle the constitutionality of the cousin bans. 272 Even more

266 998 So. 2d 731 (La. Ct. App. 2008). The court wrote: “[F]irst cousins may legally cohabitate,
have intimate relations, and even produce children; however, they are merely prohibited from
regularizing their union by marriage. This disparity would tend to negate any contention that [the
State] has a strong public policy against marriages between first cousins, since it is in conflict with
this state’s policy to legally solidify such unions for the good of society at large and for the benefit
of any potential posterity.” Id. at 748.
267 See supra Section II.B.3.
268 OTTENHEIMER, supra note 19, at 19–22, 51–52, 135–53; see Storke, supra note 55, at 474,
476–78, 481–83, 499; see also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 74 (noting that only “sometimes” do
states go so far as to find bans “even” on first-cousin marriage to be based in strong public policy
(emphasis added)).
269 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 767–68 (2013) (explaining “the long-established
precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all married couples
within each State, though they may vary, subject to constitutional guarantees, from one State to the
next”). See generally Bix, supra note 61.
270 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 767–68.
271 Id. Of course, we have by now established that more than half the nation prohibits or severely
restricts cousin marriage, a percentage that cannot accurately be called a “handful.” See supra
Section I.B.
272 The Court’s comment was made in passing, placed in parentheses as obiter dictum. It is a
throwaway comment in a paragraph whose core purpose, i.e., outlining the federalism principle
behind varying state marriage laws, was not relied upon for Windsor’s holding, which utilized
instead a rational basis review with bite/animus analysis. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 767–75. Yet, this
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critically, the Windsor holding indicated that federalism cannot be the
controlling factor in deciding a marriage case.273 The Court’s focus is on
whether the state has significantly impaired the right to marry, not on
providing as much breathing room as possible for the state to act.274
Regulations are all the more suspect when they isolate a specific class for
detrimental treatment. 275
Importantly, state courts that have directly confronted the legal
implications of the cousin bans have largely settled in favor of the couple,
meaning that this particular legislative action is found wanting.276 When
faced with conflict of laws issues arising from competing marriage
regulations,277 courts usually validate first-cousin marriages solemnized
in jurisdictions where such unions are legal. 278 The courts have found
greater value in showing interstate comity by recognizing marriages

line bears mentioning, as it is the only time the Supreme Court has ever spoken directly on the
matter of the cousin bans.
273 Id. at 768–75 (“The State’s power in defining the marital relation is of central relevance in
this case quite apart from principles of federalism. Here the State’s decision to give this class of
persons the right to marry conferred upon them a dignity and status of immense import.”). Perhaps
the Court would have avoided its offhand remark on consanguinity had it realized the extent of the
discriminatory treatment first cousins face in exercising the marriage right. See supra Section
II.B.3.
274 See supra Section I.C.
275 See supra Section I.C.4.
276 In instances where courts have held first-cousin marriage void, courts were not swayed by a
strong public policy weighing against this kind of relationship. Rather, they have been primarily
motivated by an independent concern for dissuading evasion of the law. Storke, supra note 55, at
493–97 (finding that in twelve cases where a state statute prohibited first cousins from marrying,
the out-of-state marriage was held valid in seven and void in five, but that “[t]o a greater extent
than is indicated by these figures, the tendency is to uphold the marriage in the absence of a local
marriage evasion act”); see, e.g., In re Est. of Mortenson, 316 P.2d 1106 (Ariz. 1957) (explaining
that voiding a marriage for state policy cannot be so easily defeated); Johnson v. Johnson, 106 P.
500 (Wash. 1910) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Est. of Wilbur v. Bingham, 35 P. 407, 408
(Wash. 1894)) (finding the cousins “committed a fraud upon the law of [their] domicile”). But see
State v. Nakashima, 114 P. 894, 896 (Wash. 1911) (quoting State v. Brown, 23 N.E. 747, 750 (Ohio
1890)) (invalidating first-cousin marriage, as the court is “not bound, upon principles of comity, to
permit persons to violate our criminal laws, adopted in the interest of decency and good morals,
and based on principles of sound public policy”).
277 See generally Storke, supra note 55.
278 See, e.g., In re Est. of Loughmiller, 629 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1981); Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155
N.E.2d 206 (Ohio 1958); In re Miller’s Est., 214 N.W. 428 (Mich. 1927); Garcia v. Garcia, 127
N.W. 586 (S.D. 1910); Toth v. Toth, 212 N.W.2d 812 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Mason v. Mason,
775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The federal Board of Immigration Appeals has decided in
favor of first cousins as well. See, e.g., In re Balodis, 17 I. & N. Dec. 428 (B.I.A. 1980) (granting
entry to a noncitizen based on fiancée classification when the individual openly planned to enter
the country, marry a first cousin in a state where cousin marriage is permitted, and then reside as
spouses in a state where it is barred).
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licensed abroad than in enforcing the cousin bans, 279 given their weak
justifications.280 Accordingly, in Leefeld v. Leefeld, the Supreme Court of
Oregon remarked with exasperation that the only contribution of the
state’s cousin ban was to make criminal an activity that is in essence
harmless.281 Rather than demonstrating contempt for states’ traditional
regulatory hand in marriage,282 dismantling the bans would pragmatically
settle cross-border mayhem arising from the unnecessarily inconsistent
approach to first cousins. 283
2.

The Slippery Slope

The fear of the slippery slope emerges as a reflexive rejoinder to
challenges of a marriage-related statutory scheme. 284 It insists that the
moral imperative to avoid marching down a “parade of horribles”
requires we arm the barricades much earlier 285—for instance, at first
cousins. Yet, the majority decisions in Lawrence286 and Obergefell287

279 Storke, supra note 55, at 493–97; Loughmiller, 629 P.2d at 158 (“The general rule with
regard to the recognition of marriages solemnized elsewhere is that if the marriage is valid where
contracted, it is valid everywhere.”).
280 See supra Section II.B; see also In re May’s Est., 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953) (validating a
legally solemnized marriage between an uncle and his half-niece). An uncle and half-niece share
the same amount of genetic material as first cousins. How to Use Shared DNA to Determine
Relationships, FAM. TREE MAG., https://www.familytreemagazine.com/dna/how-to-use-shareddna-to-determine-relationships [https://perma.cc/ZSJ7-9W7J].
281 166 P. 953, 954 (Or. 1917) (“It would be strange, indeed, if a marriage could have any
validity, and yet the parties by continuing the marriage relation would be guilty of a felony, and
constantly liable to be convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary.” (quoting McIlvain v. Scheibley,
59 S.W. 498, 500 (Ky. 1900))).
282 See supra Section I.C.4.
283 See Garcia, 127 N.W. 586 (lamenting the disastrous results an uneven approach to firstcousin marriage causes for inheritance rights and legitimization of children); accord Leefeld, 166
P. at 954; see also Storke, supra note 55, at 473–74.
284 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity are . . . sustainable only in light of . . . validation of laws based on moral
choices.”); see generally Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric,
and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the
Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2005) (critiquing social disgust as an illegitimate basis upon
which to legislate persons’ private affairs of romance and sex).
285 Cahill, supra note 284, at 1550–55.
286 539 U.S. at 571–79 (majority opinion) (“Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate our own moral code. . . . As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can
invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.” (internal citations omitted)).
287 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (“[W]hen that sincere, personal opposition
becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the
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suggest that changeable social mores are not viable justifications for
discriminatory behavior in the context of a fundamental right. 288 After all,
if moral norms were a sufficient basis upon which to infringe on
marriage, anti-miscegenation laws might still be part of statutory
schemes.289 A slippery slope constructed of bare social disgust cannot
support the abrogation of a fundamental right. 290
Additionally, first-cousin marriage cannot seriously be said to wait
at the bottom of the slippery slope of cascading immorality when the
practice already enjoys near-universal legality and acceptance. 291 Though
international custom by no means binds our jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has indicated global consensus is a relevant factor in evaluating the
constitutionality of marriage regulation.292 National accord with the
international consensus in the not-too-distant past further strongly
indicates first-cousin marriage does not wait at the bottom of the slippery
slope.293

State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then
denied.”).
288 Id. at 671 (“If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received practices
could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once
denied.”); see also Cahill, supra note 284, at 1548–50; McDonnell, supra note 17, at 357–59; Zhou,
supra note 17, at 227–30.
289 Bratt, supra note 17, at 289.
290 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (insisting the state has no place in criminalizing sodomy as
“[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self” free from the regulation of general society); see generally
Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect Adults Who
Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 95
(2009). Turnipseed argues for non-incestuous treatment of romantic partners who adopt one another
for inheritance purposes, a separate and distinct legal issue than the one discussed here, but
persuasive as both scenarios present flawed genetic, familial, or social justifications—leaving only
the “‘ick’ factor.” Id. at 129.
291 In this way, first-cousin marriage, a traditionally accepted form of marriage, supra Section
I.A, is insulated from criticisms lobbed at Obergefell as having rejected without explanation the
historical relevance of gender to marriage. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 236 (arguing that
Obergefell incorrectly redefines marriage as a genderless institution).
292 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 808 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Nor is
the right to same-sex marriage deeply rooted in the traditions of other nations. No country allowed
same-sex couples to marry until the Netherlands did so in 2000.”); Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 718–19
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s redefinition of “an institution as old as government
itself, and accepted by every nation in history until 15 years ago” (emphasis added)).
293 See Cahill, supra note 284, at 1562–69 (arguing incest cannot wait at the bottom of the
slippery slope where no uniform “incest” definition exists).
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CONCLUSION
States enjoy broad authority in regulating marriage.294 However, that
power runs concurrently with a fundamental right to marry based in the
Fourteenth Amendment, which imposes on states a heavy burden in
justifying infringements upon the freedom to marry the partner of one’s
choice.295 The cousin bans create a classification scheme targeting a
particular group for special impairment to their exercise of this essential
right because of an identity characteristic. 296 Such proscriptions raise the
utmost suspicion of the Court, and the states must show the characteristic
itself presents a strong reason for the discriminatory treatment. 297
The interests the state can claim for banning cousin marriage prove
to be insufficient for the task. 298 The biogenetic concern wrongly confines
the marriage right solely to its procreative function, 299 while empirical
research demands first cousins ought to be treated like any other couple
for family planning purposes. 300 The nuclear family’s asexual safety net
remains intact,301 and society as a whole does not regress as a result of
first-cousin marriage.302
Under the microscope of the high degree of scrutiny applied in
marriage cases, the bans emerge as unjustifiable denials to an arbitrary
class from exercising first cousins’ right to marry. Overturning the cousin
bans is constitutionally required and would have positive consequences
for this nation’s first-cousin couples and their families.303 It is time the
nation returns to its roots, corrects a lingering discriminatory misstep of
the post-Civil War era,304 and strikes down these perverse prohibitions.

294

Supra Section I.C.4.
Supra Sections I.C.2–I.C.3.
296 Supra Section II.A.
297 Supra Section I.C.5.
298 Supra Sections II.B–II.C.
299 Supra Section II.C.1.
300 Supra Section II.B.1.
301 Supra Section II.B.2.
302 Supra Section II.B.3.
303 See Bennett et al., supra note 13, at 115–16; BITTLES, CONSANGUINITY IN CONTEXT, supra
note 25, at 231 (“Enforced legislation . . . could in time lead us all back along . . . eugenic pathways
that are best left in the past . . . .”).
304 Supra Section I.A.2.
295

